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ABSENTEE LANDLORDS, RENT CONTROL AND
HEALTHY GENTRIFICATION: A POLICY
PROPOSAL TO DECONCENTRATE THE
POOR IN URBAN AMERICA
Jorge 0. Elorza*
ABSTRACT
Empirical data overwhelmingly suggests that the presence of mid-
dle- and working-class homeowners is beneficial for inner-city communi-
ties. Yet, absentee landlords have a systematic financial advantage over
resident landlords when it comes to purchasing homes in blighted neigh-
borhoods. This advantage has disastrous effects for inner cities, as the
communities with the greatest need for the stabilizing presence of mid-
dle- and working-class homeowners are the ones least likely to attract
them. The lack of in-moving homeowners and the resulting increase in
poverty cause declining neighborhoods to fall deeper into downward
spirals.
In this Article, I propose a rent control plan designed to attract
middle- and working- class homeowners to blighted neighborhoods, and
I argue that many positive outcomes will result. By designing this plan, I
hope to challenge the conventional wisdom that rent control has only one
legitimate purpose, reducing tenants' rents, and call attention to the ex-
ternalities caused by the absentee landlord industry. Second, I provide a
legal and economic model for inner cities to deconcentrate poverty and
to better integrate the poor into mainstream society. Third, I develop a
model for healthy gentrification whereby vicious cycles of poverty are
transformed into virtuous cycles of stability.
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INTRODUCTION
Until recently, rent control has been almost unanimously con-
demned by economists. While rent control has been effective as a short-
term tool for reducing tenants' housing costs, its long-term, adverse con-
sequences have been commonly believed to outweigh its benefits.'
While I agree with these assessments of traditional rent control schemes,2
I challenge the conventional wisdom to the extent that it assumes rent
control can have only one legitimate purpose-the reduction of tenant's
housing costs. In this Article, I hope to provide a new perspective by
developing a rent control plan with an entirely different goal: deconcen-
trating poverty by encouraging an influx of middle- and working-class
homeowners into blighted neighborhoods. 3
1 See Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes
and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 555 (1984) ("The popularity of rent control is
puzzling in view of the virtual unanimity among professional economists that rent control is, in
the long run, bad for all concerned-tenants as well as landlords."); ANTHONY DOWNS, A
REEVALUATION OF RESIDENTIAL RENT CONTROLS 45-74 (1996) (arguing that rent control de-
ters new rental construction, encourages under-maintenance, reduces tenant mobility, and pro-
duces many inefficiencies); Richard Amott, Rent Control: The International Experience,
reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 415 (2002) (arguing that rent control reduces
maintenance of the rental units, incites gentrification and abandonment by landlords, and ulti-
mately does not make the units more affordable due to key money issues and black market
transactions); Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 741, 767 (1988) (arguing that rent control deters new construction not only by
making the rental housing market less profitable in rent-controlled zones but also by sending a
chilling message that non-rent-controlled zones may soon become regulated); Robert C. El-
lickson, Rent Control: A Comment on Olsen, 67 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 947, 948 (1991) (stating
that rent control forces landlords and tenants into uncooperative relationships).
2 I define traditional rent control schemes as any whose primary purpose is the reduc-
tion of tenants' housing costs.
3 With a long and unified opposition to rent control, it is only recently that economists
and legal scholars have begun, on a limited basis, to challenge the conventional wisdom.
Commentators have examined whether a fine-tuned rent control ordinance, often referred to as
"second-generation" rent control, can partly accomplish the goal of reducing rents without
producing the harmful results of "first-generation" rent control. Often times, this analysis is
not motivated by a normative claim such as "second-generation" rent control is desirable but
rather that "second-generation" laws are not as bad as "first generation" laws. See Arnott,
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The rent control scheme I propose has been entirely overlooked by
legal and economic scholars. Depending on the needs of the local com-
munity, rent control may be designed to address an array of different
goals, and each scheme will have different legal, economic, and political
consequences. Much of the literature has missed these points and has
declared broad pronouncements of the desirability of rent control without
considering its infinite permutations. 4
This rent control plan is intended to introduce the stabilizing pres-
ence of middle- and working-class homeowners into blighted neighbor-
hoods.5 I argue that this plan can prevent the creation and perpetuation
of concentrated poverty and will help increase the neighborhood-level
contact of the poor with the middle- and working-class. If properly de-
signed to suit the local needs, rent control can transform decaying slums
into healthy and stable neighborhoods without triggering the unhealthy
kind of gentrification that has historically displaced the poor from Amer-
ican cities.
By placing a rent ceiling on absentee landlords only, 6 I argue that
the market will encourage resident landlords7 to move into rent-con-
trolled zones. Replacing absentee landlords with resident landlords will
produce both subtle and dramatic improvements in a neighborhood's liv-
ability as resident landlords will enhance the community's aesthetic, so-
cial, economic, and political composition. These resident landlords, who
will be mainly in-moving middle and working-class homeowners, will
not only have strong incentives to improve the long-term health and sta-
supra note 1, at 415 ("In recent years . . . there has been a wave, or at least a swell, of
revisionism among housing economists and policy analysts. Most experts on the subject,
while not advocates of rent-control, are now considerably more guarded and qualified in their
opposition, and some believe that a well-designed rent control program can, on balance, be
beneficial.").
4 See DENNIS KEATING ET AL., RENT CONTROL: REGULATION AND THE RENTAL HouStG
MARKET 204 (1998) [hereinafter RENT CONTROL] (noting that "[tihe varying degrees of suc-
cess of rent control programs underscore the need to consider carefully the type of rent regula-
tion enacted, the way it is implemented, and, to the extent know, its actual impact rather than
hypothetical speculation about its results."); Amott, supra note 1, at 416 ("the effects of a rent
control program are sensitive to the details of its provisions.").
5 In fact, this rent control proposal may, in the long run, actually increase rental rates.
By making neighborhoods more attractive and thereby increasing demand, it is possible that
rents will increase over time.
6 An absentee landlord is defined as the owner of a multi-unit residential building who
does not use one of the apartments as her principal place of residence. Absentee landlords
own homes that are considered non-owner-occupied.
7 A resident landlord is defined as the owner of a multi-unit residential building who
uses one of the apartments as her principal place of residence. Resident landlords live in
homes that are considered owner-occupied.
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bility of the neighborhood and its institutions,8 but they will also play a
vital socializing role.9
Part I of this Article develops a conceptual framework for under-
standing neighborhood instability. I chart a brief history of the middle
class's departure from the inner city and the forces that lead to concen-
trated poverty in these urban areas. I also call attention to the hazardous
results of an increased rate of absentee landlordism and the expected
benefits that an increased middle- and working-class homeowner pres-
ence will have on a neighborhood. Part 11 lays out the proposed rent
control scheme in detail and discusses the desirability of promoting
healthy gentrification. Part III then takes a critical look at the proposal
and considers the economic, political and legal obstacles to enacting the
rent control plan.
I. UNDERSTANDING URBAN INSTABILITY
In his classic work, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the
Underclass, and Public Policy,10 William Julius Wilson identifies a
number of structural factors responsible for concentrated poverty and the
social dislocation it produces.' 1 According to Wilson, racial, economic,
8 Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are Home-
owners Better Citizens? 2-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6363, 1998)
("[B]ecause of the high transaction costs associated with homeownership, homeowners tend to
be considerably less mobile than renters. Increased length of tenure in a community should
also encourage investments in community, since homeowners will consume the benefits of
community over a longer time period."). The few incentives for tenants to improve property
pre-date modem landlord-tenant relationships. See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 82 (5th ed. 1998) ("Most farmers were tenants. Thus, it appears that a tenant would have
little incentive to improve the land because any improvement that outlasted the period of his
lease would confer an uncompensated benefit on the landlord under the doctrine of fixture.").
9 EDWARD G. GOETZ, CLEARING THE WAY: DECONCENTRATING THE POOR IN URBAN
AMERICA 27 (2003) ("[G]reater economic diversity in a neighborhood will benefit all re-
sidents, including the poor. Research evidence shows substantial support for this proposition.
High school graduation rates, child cognitive development, and rates of teenage childbearing
can be sensitive to neighborhood effects.. .. Living in areas of concentrated poverty has been
shown to have an adverse effect on a range of life experiences, from isolating youth from
employment opportunities to consigning them to inferior education, dangerous neighborhood
conditions, and harmful environmental conditions. Studies have shown that neighborhood af-
fects employment prospects, exposure to toxic wastes, and criminal behavior. These neighbor-
hood effects are produced through the creation of a 'ghetto culture' that stresses short-term
goals; through a lock of role models and stabilizing institutions; or through underfunded
schools and reduced access to new jobs in suburban areas. While some analysts object to the
concept of the underclass . . . . there is general consensus regarding the set of behavioral
pathologies associated with concentrated poverty.") (citations omitted).
10 WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: TiE INNER CITY, THE UNDER-
CLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987).
11 Id. at 30-62 (crediting a complex web of factors entailing the effect of historic and
contemporary discrimination, the impact of structural changes in the urban economy, the flow
of migrants, and a change in the age structure of urban communities as the source of inner city
problems.).
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migratory, and demographic factors have caused a disproportionate num-
ber of the most disadvantaged people to live in "urban slums.' 2 Faced
with a combination of limited access to quality jobs and little to no
neighborhood-level contact with middle and working-class households,
the residents of these communities become progressively isolated from
mainstream society. 13 This isolation, in turn, causes "concentration ef-
fects" whereby various indicators of social dislocation such as high
crime, teenage pregnancy, joblessness, and underachieving schools rise
to exponentially high levels. 14 With time, residents (i.e. the underclass)
become accustomed to these norms and are unable to improve their situa-
tion since they fail to develop the language, attitude, education, and job
skills required for success in mainstream society. 15 Since its release,
Wilson's book has framed the debate on urban poverty; it has triggered
twenty years worth of scholarly and policy discourse, and his "concentra-
tion effects" thesis has received virtually universal empirical support. 16
12 See generally id. at 29-62.
13 Id. at 58.
14 Id. ("If I had to use one term to capture the differences in the experiences of low-
income families who live in inner-city areas from the experiences of those who live in other
areas in the central city today, that term would be 'concentration effects.' The social transfor-
mation of the inner city has resulted in a disproportionate concentration of the most disadvan-
taged segments of the urban black population, creating a social milieu significantly different
from the environment that existed in these communities several decades ago."); id. at 61
("These concentration effects include the constraints and opportunities in neighborhoods in
which the population is overwhelmingly socially disadvantaged-constraints and opportunities
that include the kids of ecological niches that the residents of these neighborhood occupy in
terms of access to jobs and job networks, availability of marriageable partners, involvement in
quality schools, and exposure to conventional role models."); see also GOETZ, supra note 9, at
237 ("[B]eing poor in a community of concentrated poverty heaps additional burdens upon
people. These communities often receive inferior public services, and therefore are home to,
for example, the most troubled and poorest-performing public schools. Furthermore, these
communities are often remote from areas enjoying the most robust job creation and expansion,
making it physically difficult for the poor to access new jobs. Such communities limit the type
of 'bridging' social capital that residents need to improve their situations. Some experts even
argue that these communities foster an oppositional culture that values and rewards 'anti-so-
cial' behaviors and substitutes a set of behavioral norms different from those held in American
society at large. These norms, while perhaps adaptive to the extreme conditions existing in
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty, only serve to further isolate those who adopt them
from society as a whole.") (citations omitted).
15 Id. at 57 ("The development of cognitive, linguistic, and other educational and job-
related skills necessary for the world of work in the mainstream economy is thereby adversely
affected.").
16 GOETZ, supra note 9, at 21 ("Publication of William Julius Wilson's The Truly Disad-
vantaged in 1987 triggered more than a decade of scholarly and policy discourse about the
dynamics of poverty in urban America. Wilson documented the extreme living conditions of
the urban underclass and argued that their systematic marginalization from mainstream social,
economic, and political life produced an adaptive set of behavioral norms."); id. at 3 ("[L]ittle
argument exists about the results of this extreme concentration of poverty. It produces a range
of social problems whose whole is greater than the sum of its parts. For example, school
delinquency, school dropout, teenage pregnancy, out-of-wedlock childbirth, violent crime, and
drug abuse rates are all greater in these communities than would be predicted by a linear
[Vol. 17:1
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In this article, I propose a rent control plan that introduces a middle
and working-class presence to inner city neighborhoods where the under-
class is currently concentrated. By preventing concentrated poverty from
developing, I argue that the "concentration effects" and the social dislo-
cation it produces will be avoided. Furthermore, I argue that this plan
will better integrate the poor into mainstream society and at the same
time reduce society's expenses such as subsidies and other costs associ-
ated with the underclass.
First, however, I offer a brief historical account that explains how
private housing choices and public housing policies have shaped the
demographic of urban neighborhoods. Specifically, I will describe how
private homeowners' choices, zoning ordinances, racial discrimination,
and federal housing policy have contributed to concentrations of poverty
in inner city neighborhoods. In this historical analysis, I purposefully
exclude a discussion of the changes in the urban economy. Although this
has contributed to urban poverty in substantial ways, the proposed plan is
not intended to directly address this problem.17
A. CONCENTRATED POVERTY AND THE ABSENCE OF THE MIDDLE
CLASS
1. The American Ideal & Exclusionary Zoning
The forces that contribute to high concentrations of poverty in inner
city neighborhoods have their genesis in the rational decision-making of
common, middle-class homeowners. Since the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, a commonly recognized American ideal has been to achieve mid-
dle-class status and move to the suburbs on the perimeter of an inner
extrapolation of poverty effects. Something about the extreme concentration of disadvantage
begets even more community and individual dysfunction."); Michael H. Schill & Susan M.
Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Ur-
ban America, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1285, 1290 (1995) ("Wilson's concentration effects hypothe-
sis has received almost universal empirical confirmation.").
17 Wilson states that the inner city's transformation from a manufacturing to a service-
based economy has created a mismatch between the jobs the inner-city poor are qualified for
and the jobs that are available. See WtLSON, supra note 10, at 41. Specifically, the growth in
jobs requiring a higher education has not benefited the urban poor who have lower educational
attainment rates. See id. Additionally, since many of the manufacturing jobs have moved
from the inner-city to the suburbs, there is a spatial mismatch between the location of available
jobs and the neighborhoods in which the poor reside. See id. at 42.
While finding a solution to the lack of jobs available to inner-city residents is crucial for
deconcentrating poverty, I exclude this from my analysis because the proposed rent control
scheme will not have a significant effect on creating new jobs. In this article, I limit my
discussion of inner-city employment to Wilson's "social buffer" thesis, the positive socializing
presence of employed individuals, and the ability of employed individuals to connect the un-
employed to job networks. See id. at 56-57.
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city.' 8 For those able to afford the move, 19 the early suburbs offered
greater open-space and more comfortable living conditions than those
found in the inner city slums. 20 As second and third generation Euro-
pean immigrants attained middle-class status, they fled the ethnic slums
of the inner city and moved to the early suburbs. 21 Thus began the mod-
em trend of the middle class's flight from the inner city, and their segre-
gation from the lower-class.
By the 1920s, however, the greater financial wherewithal of the
middle class was insufficient to insulate it from the low-income, shanty
communities of the inner city. Booming, industrial economies caused
central cities to grow and rapidly expanded their borders. 22 The cities'
expansions soon began to encroach upon and eventually consumed the
early suburbs on the periphery of the central cities. 23 Within a short
time, once peaceful, single-family home suburbs were transformed into
crowded neighborhoods with subdivided old homes and multi-family
new ones. Suburbs that were located further away from the central city
witnessed the consumption of the inner suburbs by the expanding inner
city and many suburbs adopted zoning ordinances to prevent their com-
munities from suffering the same fates.24 By setting minimum lot sizes
and restricting the number of residential units on a lot, these suburbs
18 SAM B. WARNER, JR., STREETCAR SUBURBS: THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN BOSTON,
1870-1900, at 162 (1962) (stating that the "rural ideal ... had encouraged middle class fami-
lies to seek escape from the conditions of modem industrial life into an isolated family
environment.").
19 See generally id. (discussing the great influence of transportation in housing patterns
during the first half of the twentieth century). The cost of living in the suburbs included the
daily commuting expenses. Id. at 52. Since public transportation was relatively limited and
private coaches and cars were very expensive, living within walking distance of the factories
demanded that the poor reside in inner city neighborhoods. Id. at 52-56. However, as public
transportation improved, housing options expanded for the working class as they could now
commute from farther distances. Id. at 64.
20 See, e.g., JOHN H. MOLLENKOPF, THE CONTESTED CITY 36 (1983) ("In its study Our
Cities, released in 1937 the National Resources Committee ... characterized [cities] as 'the
dusty and sometimes smoldering and reddened arena of industrial conflict."').
21 See generally WARNER, supra note 18, at 164 (discussing the migration of "American-
ized" immigrants from the slums of the inner city to the suburbs).
22 Id. at 56 ("Throughout the last third of the nineteenth century those areas just beyond
the periphery of the old walking city enjoyed the most rapid growth. Here lower middle class
construction filled all the farms, estates, and vacant lots .... The lots were so small and the
pattern of living so dense that the rural setting was lost altogether."); id. at 161 (stating that
low-income groups came to occupy the suburbs but only "by destroying much of what the
suburb had achieved").
23 Id. at 56, 161.
24 Andrew J. Cappel, A Walk Along Willow: Patterns of Land Use Coordination in Pre-
Zoning New Haven (1870-1926), 101 YALE L.J. 617, 634 (1991) ("Initial interest in zoning
appears to have arisen as the result of anxieties associated with the rapid pace of urban growth
in the years after 1870."); see also MOLLENKOPF, supra note 20, at 37 (stating that exclusion-
ary practices in the Los Angeles metropolitan area originated from, among other factors, "sub-
urban residents seeking to avoid paying for services to the less affluent").
[Vol. 17:1
2007] LANDLORDS, RENT CONTROL AND HEALTHY GENTRIFICATION 9
were able to restrict the construction of low-income housing within their
borders and thereby prevent the "invasion" of low-income families.25
The effect of zoning ordinances on the poor was to erect a virtual
barricade to living in the suburbs. Without viable housing options in the
suburbs, the poor were relegated to the shanty neighborhoods of the inner
city. Whereas free market forces would have converted the suburbs into
low-income housing,26 zoning ordinances prevented this from occurring.
Economic advantage first allowed the middle class to flee from its lower-
class neighbors, and zoning ordinances later allowed it to insulate itself
from them. These systems of growth and regulation began the concen-
tration of the poor within the inner city. 27
2. Federal Housing Policy & Racial Discrimination
Federal housing policy and racial discrimination encouraged the
flight of middle-income households from the inner city and at the same
time constrained low-income households' mobility. From the mid-1930s
to the mid-1970s, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) provided
$119 billion in home mortgage insurance, which allowed many Ameri-
25 Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), overruled
by Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ("The purpose to be accom-
plished is really to regulate the mode of living of persons who may hereafter inhabit it....
[T]he result to be accomplished is to classify the population and segregate them according to
their income or situation in life. The true reason why some persons live in a mansion and
others in a shack, why some live in a single-family dwelling and others in a double-family
dwelling, why some live in a two-family dwelling and others in an apartment, or why some
live in a well-kept apartment and others in a tenement, is primarily economic. It is a matter of
income and wealth, plus the labor and difficulty of procuring adequate domestic service.
Aside from contributing to these results and furthering such class tendencies, the ordinance has
also an esthetic purpose; that is to say, to make this village develop into a city along lines now
conceived by the village council to be attractive and beautiful."); see also S. Burlington
County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 723 (N.J. 1975) ("Almost every
[developing municipality] acts solely in its own selfish and parochial interest and in effect
builds a wall around itself to keep out those people or entities not adding favorably to the tax
base"); SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDER-
MINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 104-06 (2004) (arguing that "Euclidian" zoning ordinances
were primarily intended to exclude the people who would live in unwanted apartment build-
ings and duplexes).
26 Many homeowners opposed zoning ordinances because it prevented them from con-
verting their properties to the most profitable use. To many homeowners, building an apart-
ment house with many rental units would have been more profitable than building a single
family home. See, e.g., DowNs, supra note 1, at 97 (stating that multi-family apartment build-
ings are the most economic built form of rental housing).
27 Another factor that cannot be underestimated is the construction of interstate high-
ways. This federally funded program contributed to the separation of the middle class from
the inner-city poor by subsidizing the cost of building the suburbs. See CASHIN, supra note 25,
at 113-15 (discussing the racial and class division subsidized by the federal highway
program).
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cans to become first-time homebuyers. 28 However, the benefits of the
FHA program were extended primarily to the suburbs and their white
residents as the FHA displayed an "anti-urban" and anti-black bias.29
Potential homebuyers in the inner cities found it difficult to obtain
loans under the FHA program, and when they did, it was on less
favorable terms than suburban homebuyers. 30  Prospective inner-city
homebuyers, who were disproportionately black, found that the "federal
government displayed an intense color consciousness and insisted on dis-
criminatory practices" by "virtually demand[ing] the use of racially re-
strictive covenants as a precondition before granting loan guarantees." 31
As federal assistance subsidized the building of suburban homes, inner
city residents were either shut out or spurned from participating in one of
the greatest wealth building schemes in American history: homeowner-
ship. 32 In this way, as Arnold Hirsch notes in With or Without Jim
Crow: Black Residential Segregation in the United States, "[T]he federal
government invited and underwrote the outward migration of the white
middle class and eroded the economic viability of the inner city."' 33 The
results proved devastating for future generations of inner-city residents. 34
At the same time that middle-income households used the FHA in-
surance program to flee the inner cities, blacks began a massive popula-
tion shift from southern rural towns to Northern and Midwestern
industrial cities. As cotton picking became increasingly mechanized in
the 1940s and 1950s and the demand for unskilled labor in the South
28 Arnold Hirsch, With or Without Jim Crow: Black Residential Segregation in the
United States, in URBAN POLICY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 65, 89 (Arnold R. Hirsch
& Raymond A. Mohl eds., 1993); CASHIN, supra note 25, at 110-11.
29 Hirsch, supra note 28, at 86; Schill & Wachter, supra note 16, at 1309-10.
30 Hirsch, supra note 28, at 86-87 ("Narrow lots, multifamily dwellings, rental units, and
rehabilitation projects all had great difficulty acquiring FHA insurance, and managed to do so
only infrequently, if at all, on terms less favorable than those granted to single detached homes
in the suburbs.").
31 Id. at 85.
32 CASHIN, supra note 25, at 113 ("[B]y withholding FHA insurance for loans in racially
integrated or predominately black areas, FHA also greatly limited the home ownership options
available to people of color. It prevented African Americans from participating in one of the
largest wealth-producing programs in the history of our country."); Hirsch, supra note 28, at
91 ("[L]ess than two percent of the housing constructed with federally insured mortgages be-
tween 1946 and 1959 was made available to Blacks.").
33 Hirsch, supra note 28, at 87.
34 Id. at 86 ("[The Federal Housing Administration and public housing] facilitated the
massive postwar suburban boom, helped strip older towns of their middle classes, and practi-
cally assured that thousands of the poorest blacks would remain locked in economically weak-
ened central cities.").
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plummeted,35 black farm workers migrated to the North and Midwest as
economic opportunity lured yet greater numbers of blacks.36
The housing vacancies left in inner cities by middle-income, sub-
urb-bound whites were quickly filled by lower-income, in-moving blacks
as "[t]he twentieth-century movement of blacks from the farms into
American cities coincided with a white exodus out of the city to the sub-
urbs."'37 This migration resulted in a lasting pattern of residential segre-
gation, on both racial and economic grounds, whereby whites in northern
and midwestern cities moved to the suburbs and created a ring around the
central, black core.38
The slum clearance and public housing programs further contributed
to the isolation and concentration of the poor. Public housing develop-
ments were often built in areas with an already high degree of poverty, as
communities with stronger political power successfully stove off at-
tempts to build projects within their borders. 39 As the slums were
cleared of older, dilapidated housing, many people not accommodated by
the newly constructed public housing units were forced to move to tran-
sitional and low-quality housing in other parts of the inner city. 40 Ulti-
mately, public housing simply resegregated the poor (particularly the
black poor) in areas with already high population densities. 4 1 In this
35 DANIEL R. FUSFELD & TIMOTHY BATES, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE URBAN GHETTO
61-62 (1984) ("Mechanization reduced the need for agricultural workers, and those who were
employed in the remaining labor intensive phases of crop production were able to find work a
much smaller number of days each year, relative to the pre-mechanization phase of farming.").
36 Id. at 65 (describing the decrease and increase of the black population in the South and
North, respectively).
37 Hirsch, supra note 28, at 67; see also MOLLENKOPF, supra note 20, at 28 (describing
the vacuum left by the departure of the white middle and professional class as "not negative
for everyone.... because it fostered a substantial migration of blacks and other minorities into
the central cities."); Hirsch, supra note 28, at 70 ("The overwhelming majority of black south-
ern migrants ... [were] poor, and the brute facts of economic life greatly restricted the housing
opportunities available to them." Therefore, for many blacks, their only housing options were
in the shanty slums of the inner cities.).
38 Hirsch, supra note 28, at 87 ("Public policy.., gravely affect[ed] the pace and nature
of that outward movement; the sudden appearance of white suburbs ringing increasingly
Black-core cities ... must be viewed in the context of federal management and support.").
39 Alastair Smith, Mixed Income Housing Developments: Promise and Reality, JOINT
CENTER FOR HousNG STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY 8 (2002) ("Many high-density, mul-
tifamily public-housing developments were sited in neighborhoods that already had high levels
of poverty, and created an influx of very-low-income tenants. Often this was due to the objec-
tions of higher-income neighborhoods to sitting the developments there, making low-income
neighborhoods the only politically feasible sites to build the housing.").
40 Hirsch, supra note 28, at 89.
41 Id. ("Public housing, frequently used simply to free inner-city land for private devel-
opment, became increasingly identified as a 'Black' program, used high-rise construction, and
resegregated its tenants in already densely populated core areas."); Schill & Wachter, supra
note 16, at 1293 ("After ensuring that most public housing would be built in central cities,
Congress also used statutory admissions requirements to fill public housing with extremely
poor residents.").
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way, concentrated poverty reached a size and scope that had never before
been witnessed in the United States.42
Housing policies and racial discrimination have had a profound ef-
fect on the makeup and structure of inner cities. "[T]hey facilitated the
massive postwar suburban boom, helped strip older towns of their middle
classes, and practically assured that thousands of the poorest blacks
would remain locked in economically weakened central cities. '43 The
middle class's flight from the inner city precipitated only greater middle
class flight, as inner-city neighborhoods' tax bases declined and crime
rates rose. 44 The legacy of these public and private forces has shaped the
composition of modem-day blighted and high-poverty neighborhoods
and has greatly contributed to the social pathologies within them.
B. BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED RENT CONTROL PLAN
1. Middle- and Working-Class Presence
Much of the distress experienced in blighted, high-poverty commu-
nities is due to the migration of middle-income households from the cen-
tral city to the suburbs and the concentration of poverty their departure
produces. 45 In turn, this concentrated poverty negatively impacts school
42 Hirsch, supra note 28, at 65. (stating that "[T]he rise of the urban ghetto-a massive,
geographically continuous, isolated place of almost exclusively black residence and institu-
tional life-is a relatively recent phenomenon.). See generally id. (crediting the rise of the
urban ghetto to the federal government's growing presence in urban affairs and to the persist-
ently high levels of racial segregation).
43 Hirsch, supra note 28, at 86.
44 OSCAR NEWMAN, COMMUNITY OF INTEREST 83 (1980) ("In the early 1960s municipali-
ties which were unconcerned with what they read as a small decline in their middle-income
populations were surprised to see how quickly the combination of increasing crime and a
declining tax base mushroomed into a crisis which sent wave after wave of middle-income
residents scurrying to the suburbs. Some municipalities experienced a turnover in their popu-
lations within five years that no urban renewal program could redress in twenty. The circum-
stances in St. Louis, Detroit, Newark, Cleveland, and Washington bear witness to the
uniformity of the malaise and the inevitability of the results. Municipalities which were not
able to maintain a majority of middle-income residents entered into a declining spiral in which
their initial descent only served to accelerate their further fall. In such circumstances it was
not uncommon for middle-income residents to become critical actors in a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy: their fears as to what would happen to their property values if they did not leave their
neighborhoods quickly were realized-partly as a result of their own attitudes and hurried
departures.").
45 See generally Roberto G. Quercia & George C. Galster, Threshold Effects and the
Expected Benefits of Attracting Middle-Income Households to the Central City, 8 HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE 409 (1997) ("Over the past four decades, the transformation of large cities has
been characterized by the suburbanization of America's middle-income households. During
the same period, deteriorating inner-city areas have experienced ever greater fiscal and social
distress."); see also Mark L. Joseph, Is Mixed-Income Development an Antidote to Urban
Poverty?, 17 HousINo POL'Y DEBATE 209, 213-16 (2006) (assessing the potential of mixed-
income developments for lifting families out of poverty); Tama Leventhal & Jeanne Brooks-
Gunn, The Neighborhoods They Live in: The Effects of Neighborhood Residence on Child and
Adolescent Outcomes, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 309 (2000) (reporting that individuals living in
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performance, causes crime rates to mushroom, and increases family frag-
mentation, substance abuse, and teenage pregnancy. 46 Without a middle-
and working-class presence, the social and fiscal stability of cities is sub-
stantially undermined. 47
By introducing a middle- and working-class presence into inner cit-
ies, rent control can be expected to produce substantial social benefits. It
is widely believed that the demographic composition of a neighborhood
influences the "collective socialization process[ ] by shaping the type of
role models youth are exposed to outside the home. '48 As the middle
class leaves the inner city, the social institutions and personal networks
they support begin to break down. Whereas children living in neighbor-
hoods where most adults are steadily employed develop "behaviors and
attitudes that are conducive to success in both school and work," 49 chil-
dren from the underclass have few employed role models and develop
behaviors and attitudes that are increasingly distant from wider society.50
neighborhoods with low socioeconomic status have a relatively high rate of behavioral and
emotional problems); Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Con-
centrated Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 7-9
(2006) (discussing the trend during the twentieth century of middle-income households leaving
the inner city and moving to the suburbs).
46 See Smith, supra note 39, at 7; see also Yili Xu, Mora L. Fiedler & Karl H. Flaming,
Discovering the Impact of Community Policing: The Broken Windows Thesis, Collective Effi-
cacy, and Citizens' Judgment, 42 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 147, 167 (2005) ("At the commu-
nity level, urban decay, manifested by devastating disorder and crime, and collapsed moral
standards, is the ideal soil for propagation of crime. It alienates people, weakens the informal
social control, provides the safe haven for criminals, and makes citizens more vulnerable to
crime. In general, deteriorating communities produce more criminals and victims.").
47 Quercia & Galster, supra note 45, at 410-11 (arguing that "the out-migration of up-
per-income households has had a double impact on inner-city residents: fiscal and social. Fis-
cally, the loss of middle- and upper-income households has affected central cities in two ways.
It has decreased the demand for housing, thus reducing its value and the city's tax base. Also,
this loss has left inner-city residents with weakened political power to attract public resources
from state legislatures to their neighborhoods. Socially, the loss of middle- and upper-income
households has weakened basic institutions and left high concentrations of low-income inner-
city residents with no middle-class role models to emulate and with few means of learning
about employment opportunities often located in the metropolitan periphery.").
48 James W. Ainsworth, Why Does it Take a Village?: The Mediation of Neighborhood
Effects on Educational Achievement, 81 Soc. FORCES 117, 119 (2002).
49 Id.
50 DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 165-66 (1994) ("In response to the harsh and isolated
conditions of ghetto life, a segment of the urban black population has evolved a set of behav-
iors, attitudes, and values that are increasingly at variance with those held in the wider society.
Although these adaptations represent rational accommodations to social and economic condi-
tions within the ghetto, they are not widely accepted or understood outside of it, and in fact are
negatively evaluated by most of American society."); see also Quercia & Galster, supra note
45, at 411 ("Socially, the loss of middle- and upper-income households has weakened basic
institutions and left high concentrations of low-income inner-city residents with no middle-
class role models to emulate and with few means of learning about employment opportunities
often located in the metropolitan periphery.").
14 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
Overall, the absence of middle-income households has left the inner-city
poor spatially and socially isolated from those who can provide a model
for the attitudes and behaviors conducive to success in mainstream
society. 5,
Among other benefits, the presence of higher-income households in
a neighborhood is expected to reduce crime52 and improve neighborhood
schools. 53 These results are particularly appealing because an improve-
ment of either would likely benefit all of the neighborhood's residents.
Commentators have noted that because of their younger populations,
denser living patterns, and lower tax bases, low-income communities are
both more vulnerable to crime and less likely to receive police services. 54
Additionally, it is believed that middle-income households have a lower
tolerance for criminal activity and have greater demand and support for
police services that deter crime. 55 Because of this, it is expected that
51 WIsoN, supra note 10, at 56-57 ("However, in ghetto neighborhoods that have ex-
perienced a steady out-migration of middle- and working-class families .... The net effect is
that joblessness, as a way of life, takes on a different social meaning; the relationship between
schooling and post-school employment takes on a different meaning. The development of
cognitive, linguistic, and other educational and job-related skills necessary for the world of
work in the mainstream economy is thereby adversely affected."); see also Owen Fiss, What
Should Be Done For Those Who Have Been Left Behind?, in A WAY OUT: AMERICA'S GHET-
TOS AND THE LEGACY OF RACISM 3, 14 (Joshua Cohen et al. ed., 2003) (stating that the plight
of blighted inner city neighborhoods is due to "the weakening of social institutions and net-
works that results from the exodus of those who made it. The community is left to turn on
itself, exposing those in the ghetto to a heightened risk of crime and violence, which degrades
the quality of life in the community and creates further incentives for individual families and
local businesses to flee. The sense of isolation increases as the quality of life spirals
downward.").
52 See NEWMAN, supra note 44, at 82-83 (speculating a number of reasons for the crime
resistive capacity of middle-income communities, including a stronger tax base, fewer chil-
dren, higher rate of two-parent households, and universally shared expectations about publicly
acceptable behavior).
53 See Smith, supra note 39, at 10 (citing Elvyn K. Wyly & Daniel J. Hammel, Islands of
Decay in Seas of Renewal: Housing Policy and the Resurgence of Gentrification, 10 HOuSING
POL'Y DEBATE 711 (1999) (stating that higher-income households will have an impact on
reducing crime and improving neighborhood schools)).
54 See NEWMAN, supra note 44, at 83 (stating that the flight of middle-class households
increases crime in five ways: (1) lower-income people are both more vulnerable to crime and
have "youth with a greater proclivity toward engaging in criminal activities;" (2) lower-income
people live in subdivided homes with common entryways, leaving occupants more vulnerable;
(3) it creates a higher density population; (4) it lowers the tax base and funds for police ser-
vices; and (5) "it removes a population with a low tolerance for crime, a strong demand for
police presence, and a support of police activities which deter crime."); see also Smith, supra
note 39, at 9 ("Very poor adults and their children may be less likely to engage in negative
behavior if higher-income families are present.").
55 See NEWMAN, supra note 44, at 82 (arguing that middle-income communities have "a
more universally shared set of expectations about what constitutes acceptable behavior in pub-
lic streets and parks and are adamant about seeing to it that these rules are kept and, in their
breach, demand, receive, and support police intervention.").
[Vol. 17:1
2007] LANDLORDS, RENT CONTROL AND HEALTHY GENTRIFICATION 15
neighborhoods will experience lower crime rates if higher-income fami-
lies are present. 56
Social scientists also suggest that children's educational outcomes
are severely hindered by the absence of middle income households.
Specifically, with fewer positive role models in their
neighborhood, children may be less likely to learn im-
portant behaviors and attitudes that lead to success in
school (e.g., high educational expectations or effort),
both because of a lack of exposure to them and because
they have no direct evidence that these attitudes and be-
haviors are useful or desirable. 57
It is further suggested that introducing a middle-income presence will
provide better monitoring of deviant behavior so as to prevent the devel-
opment of anti-school attitudes. 58 A middle-income presence will also
provide greater resources and opportunities that will prove educationally
beneficial by improving students' perceptions of job opportunities and by
generally improving the schools students attend. 59 A 2002 study con-
cluded that "[c]learly, the presence of high-status residents in the neigh-
borhood plays a statistically important role in students' academic
achievement. '60
Introducing a middle- and working-class presence is expected to
produce fiscal benefits as well. Neighborhoods with low demand for
housing reduce the value of the city's tax base, the primary source of
revenue for American cities.61 With a diminished tax base, inner cities
are increasingly unable to provide essential government services to their
residents. But if there is a greater presence of middle-income house-
holds, the aggregate assessed value of homes will increase and allow for
greater tax revenue collections. 62 Furthermore, the introduction and re-
tention of middle- and working-class families is expected to forestall
56 See NEWMAN, supra note 44, at 83; Smith, supra note 39, at 10.
57 Ainsworth, supra note 48, at 119-20.
58 Id. at 117-21 (describing the various theories that explain how neighborhood charac-
teristics affect educational outcomes. Namely, the author discusses collective socialization,
social control, social capital, differential occupational opportunity, and institutional
characteristics.).
59 Id.; see also WILSON, supra note 10, at 57 (stating that as the middle-class move from
the inner-city, "[tihe prospects for employment diminish, other alternatives such as welfare
and the underground economy are not only increasingly relied on, they come to be seen as a
new way of life").
60 Ainsworth, supra note 48, at 131.
61 Quercia & Galster, supra note 45, at 410-12.
62 Id. at 412 ("[T]he unambiguous net effect [of having a greater middle income pres-
ence] will be to raise the aggregate assessed values of residences in the central-city jurisdic-
tion, thereby permitting greater tax revenue collections from any given effective property tax
rate.").
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abandonment, a condition that entirely removes properties from the local
tax rolls. 63
Aside from the increased tax base, Quercia and Galster argue that a
middle- and working-class presence may help inner cities leverage politi-
cal power into a larger share of state resources. 64 As the middle class left
the inner city, it left behind poorer residents "with weakened political
power to attract public resources from state legislatures to their neighbor-
hoods. '65 Thus, "the balance of power in state legislatures shifted in
favor of suburbs."'66 By attracting and retaining the stable and emerging
middle class, cities can begin to reverse this trend and shift the balance of
power back to inner cities. Ultimately, this will result in a greater share
of state resources being devoted to the inner cities.
The absence of middle-income households has contributed to the
concentration of poverty and has negatively impacted the social, fiscal,
and political structure of inner-city life. Initial research on mixed-in-
come communities has "[lent] support to the importance of healthy
neighborhoods in breaking the cycle of poverty" 67 and "[m]any policy
makers have concluded that these concentrations [of poverty] must be
broken up at all costs."'68 By reintroducing and retaining middle-income
families in inner cities, it is expected that concentration effects and the
dislocation they produce (such as declining school performance, high
rates of criminal activity, family fragmentation, substance abuse, and
teenage pregnancy) will decline, while the revenue base and social net-
works will improve. Middle-income households, therefore, are vital to
the stability and overall health of inner city communities.
63 Id. ("Middle-income resettlement in the central city is expected to have a direct effect
on property tax revenues by increasing the demand for middle-quality housing, thus raising
housing prices in this submarket and forestalling abandonment in the lower-quality
submarket.").
64 Id. at 414 ("Bringing back or retaining middle-income households is expected to re-
verse the trend and somewhat shift the balance of power back to the cities, resulting in greater
state transfers to cities.").
65 Id. at 411.
66 Id. at 414.
67 Smith, supra note 39, at 9; see also Ainsworth, supra note 48, at 118 ("Increasing
concentration of poverty in urban areas over the last thirty years has renewed interest in the
effects of neighborhood-level conditions on the well-being of residents.").
68 See Smith, supra, note 39, at 8; see also Fiss, supra note 51, at 28 ("It is a social
structure that concentrates and isolates the most disadvantaged and creates its own distinctive
culture, and thus is integral to the perpetuation of the underclass. It is the paramount mecha-
nism through which a historically subordinated group continues to be kept far beneath others
in terms of wealth, power, and living standards. Accordingly, we need strategies that promise
to dismantle that structure-to tear down the walls of the ghetto.").
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2. Higher Rate of Homeownership
Not only are blighted, inner-city neighborhoods plagued by an ab-
sence of middle- and working-class residents but they also suffer from
high rates of absentee landlords. 69 This effectively deprives these com-
munities of the benefits associated with high rates of homeownership,
benefits that are quite substantial. By producing a greater presence of
homeowners, as opposed to tenants, rent control can produce a number
of direct and indirect benefits to all of the members in the community.
High homeownership rates increase property values and establish
stability and cohesion within a neighborhood. A study conducted from
1980-1990 found that a 1% increase in the homeownership rate in-
creased the value of each home in the area by an average of $800 and a
10% increase in the homeownership rate produced an average increase of
$8,000. 70 Also, a number of empirical studies show that neighborhoods
are stabilized by homeownership because of decreased turnover and
greater upkeep and maintenance. 7 ' Additionally, homeowners are more
likely to be civically involved, to be a part of an organization, and to
participate in collective political action,72 all of which promote greater
neighborhood cohesion.
69 The impact of absentee landlords on neighborhoods has been significantly under-
researched. Many authors lament the dearth of information in this area. See, e.g., Donald R.
Haurin et al., The Impact of Neighborhood Homeownership Rates: A Review of the Theoretical
and Empirical Literature, 13 J. HOUSING REs. 119, 143 (2003) ("Given the small amount of
research on neighborhood homeownership effects, it is too early to know the nature of the
relationship between neighborhood homeownership rates and net social benefits."); see also
Joseph Harkness & Sandra J. Newman, Homeownership for the Poor in Distressed Neighbor-
hoods: Does This Make Sense?, 13 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 597, 599 ("Another critical neigh-
borhood feature may be the homeownership rate, which has been largely ignored in the sizable
and growing body of research on the effects of distressed neighborhoods on the life chances of
children.").
70 William M. Rohe & Leslie S. Stewart, Homeownership and Neighborhood Stability, 7
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 37, 66 (1996) (exploring how homeownership rates affect neighbor-
hood stability via study performed on single family homes, while admitting that the increase in
property value is not limited to single-family homes).
71 See id. at 47-49, 51-52 (reviewing literature on the relation between homeownership
and repairs, maintenance, and residential mobility); cf. Denise DiPasquale & Edward L.
Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better Citizens?, 45 J. URB. ECON.
354, 355 (1999) ("[Blecause of the high transaction costs associated with homeownership,
homeowners tend to be considerably less mobile than renters. Increased length of tenure in a
community should also encourage investments in community, since homeowners will consume
the benefits of community over a longer time period.").
72 Rohe & Stewart, supra note 70, at 46 ("The empirical evidence indicates that home-
owners are indeed more likely than renters to participate in local organizations, even after
controlling for income, education, and other socioeconomic characteristics."); DiPasquale &
Glaeser, supra note 71, at 356 ("Homeowners are 15% more likely to vote in local [elections]
and 6% more likely to work to solve local problems."). But see William M. Rohe & Michael
A. Stegman, The Impact of Homeownership on the Social and Political Involvement of Low-
Income People, 30 URB. AF. Q. 152 (1994) (finding that low-income homeowners are more
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Homeownership also affects the children of homeowners and has
been found to positively impact education, crime and teenage pregnancy
within a neighborhood. Homeownership, as opposed to renting, pro-
duces a higher-quality home environment 73 which translates into positive
outcomes for children. In fact, "cognitive outcomes are up to nine per-
cent higher in math achievement and seven percent higher in reading
achievement for children living in owned homes, ceteris paribus"74 and
further, children living in owned homes are less likely to drop out of high
school or to become parents as teenagers. 75 This last indicator, having
children during adolescence, is particularly noteworthy because teenage
pregnancy is highly correlated with welfare dependency.7 6
As for crime, the low rate of homeownership is once again impor-
tant because children of homeowners have been found to have fewer be-
havioral problems. 77 Although it is yet unclear whether lower crime
rates are direct results of increased homeownership or a result of in-
creased residential stability, neighborhoods with higher homeownership
rates have less crime. 78
The neighborhood-level effects of low homeownership (high absen-
tee landlord) rates go beyond decreased educational outcomes and in-
creased crime. Increasing the homeownership rate is also expected to
improve the physical structure of a neighborhood's housing stock. 79 Re-
likely than renters to belong to neighborhood and block associations, but not other community
organizations).
73 Donald R. Haurin et al., The Impact of Homeownership on Child Outcomes 15 (Joint
Ctr. for Housing Studies of Harvard Univ., Low-Income Homeownership Working P~aper Se-
ries, LIHO-01.14, 2001), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeowner-
ship/1iho0 1-14.pdf.
74 Id.
75 Richard K. Green & Michelle J. White, Measuring the Benefits of Homeowning: Ef-
fects on Children, 41 J. URB. ECON. 441, 457 (1994).
76 See Chong-Bum An et al., Teen Out-of-Wedlock Births and Welfare Receipt: The Role
of the Childhood Events and Economic Circumstances, 75 REv. EcON. & STAT. 195, 195
(1993) ("[T]hree out of four recipients of AFDC [welfare] benefits who are under age 30 first
gave birth as a teenager, in most cases out of wedlock .... [In 1990,] about $20 billion was
paid a year to teenage mothers through welfare benefits, food stamps, and Medicaid."); Greg J.
Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, Welfare Benefits, Economic Opportunities and the Incidence of
Out-of-Wedlock Births among Black Teenage Girls, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 519, 519 (1990) ("Ex-
tensive welfare dependence and poverty are especially common among [black families that
consist of teenage mothers bearing out-of-wedlock children].").
77 Haurin et al., supra note 73, at 15 ("these youth's greater cognitive abilities and fewer
behavioral problems will result in higher educational attainment, greater future earnings, and a
reduced tendency to engage in deviant behavior."); see also Robert J. Sampson et al., Neigh-
borhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918
(Aug. 1997).
78 Id.
79 See GEORGE C. GALSTER, HOMEOWNERS AND NEIGHBORHOOD REINVESTMENT 296
(1987) (indicating the "strong evidence that owner-occupants are better maintainers of single-
family homes than are absentee-owners, even when controlling for differences in occupants,
structure type and age, and surrounding neighborhood."); Rohe & Stewart, supra note 70, at 48
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search has shown that resident landlords maintain their properties at
greater levels than absentee landlords, and that homeowners are better
prepared to pay for the upkeep and maintenance of their properties, even
when other socioeconomic factors are controlled.80 To emphasize the
importance of increasing a neighborhood's homeownership rate, Galster
states:
If nontrivial numbers of previously rented dwellings
now converted to owner-occupancy are located in a
given neighborhood, one can predict that the overall
levels of upkeep in that area will be enhanced greatly.
The expected impact likely is of a much larger degree
than would ensue even from dramatic increases in resi-
dent socioeconomic status, optimistic neighborhood ex-
pectation, or neighborhood cohesiveness. . . . Indeed,
expanding the number of homeowners appears to be the
single most potent means for encouraging the upkeep of
dwellings in a neighborhood. And the differences are
even more dramatic when considering low-income
occupants. 81
High levels of absentee landlordism prevent the neighborhood bene-
fits of homeownership from accruing to blighted, inner city neighbor-
hoods. As a result, increased instability, high crime, underperforming
schools, civic disengagement, high teenage pregnancy rates, and deterio-
rating physical structure continue to plague these communities. These
conditions in turn cause blighted neighborhoods to not only foster, but to
also maintain and reproduce an underclass culture.
C. ABSENTEE LANDLORDS AND THE SELF-PERPETUATING CYCLE OF
BLIGHT
Local housing markets, and the incentives they provide, ensure that
those neighborhoods most in need of the stabilizing presence of middle-
and working-class homeowners are the ones least likely to attract them.
Blighted, inner city neighborhoods with high poverty rates attract absen-
tee landlords and at the same time repel potential resident landlords. The
("Research consistently shows that homeowners are more likely than renters to undertake re-
pairs and that they spend more on them .... Some studies also indicate that resident landlords
maintain their properties at higher levels than absentee landlords."); cf. Richard N. Spivack,
The Determinants of Housing Maintenance and Upkeep: A Case Study of Providence, Rhode
Island, 23 APPLIED ECON. 639, 643 (1991) (finding that the "absentee-landlord" variable was
the most important factor in determining residential maintenance and upkeep decisions in a
ten-year study conducted in Providence, Rhode Island).
80 See Rohe & Stewart, supra note 70, at 84.
81 GALSTER, supra note 79, at 296.
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result is a downward spiral whereby the neighborhood's decline assures
its further descent. 82
In this section, I set out to answer the question of why there are so
many absentee landlords in blighted neighborhoods. 83 It seems intui-
tively correct to think that people with enough purchasing power to buy a
house would choose to live in a healthy and stable neighborhood, rather
than in a deteriorating one with high poverty rates and many social
problems. So initially, it makes sense to think that poor and unstable
neighborhoods would have low homeownership rates. However, when
pressed further, this explanation is not entirely satisfactory.
Basic economics tells us that if demand is low, property values will
be low as well. Imagine a world without absentee landlords where all
homeowners reside on their property. One would expect that if there is
such a great aversion to living in a blighted neighborhood, the value of
the homes in these neighborhoods would correspondingly decline to re-
flect the lower demand.84 As home values decline, they will eventually
attract willing purchasers. While some people would undoubtedly say,
"You couldn't pay me to live there!," others would inevitably conclude,
"At such a low price, buying a house in this neighborhood is a good
investment." Faced with the prospect of prohibitively expensive neigh-
82 See NEWMAN, supra note 44.
83
Homeowning Renting Number of
Category Households Households Households
Category I 73.9% 26.1% 66,932,648
Category II 60.6% 39.4% 20,501,789
Category I (High Poverty) 46.8% 53.2% 15,520,169
Category IV (Extreme Poverty) 27.2% 72.8% 2,525,495
Census data show the following household homeownership rates for the following four catego-
ries: Category I (0%-12.3% Poverty Rate), Category II (12.4%-19.9% Poverty Rate), Cate-
gory III (20%-39.9% Poverty Rate), Category IV (Over 40% Poverty Rate). See Alemayehu
Bishaw, Areas with Concentrated Poverty: 1999, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSR-16 at 11
(July 2005). A partial explanation for the high rental rates in High and Extreme Poverty
neighborhoods is the concentration of subsidized and public housing units in these neighbor-
hoods. However, the 1.3 million households living in public housing and the 4.5 million
households living in subsidized housing cannot account for the over 18 million households
living in either High or Extreme Poverty neighborhoods. Id.; Roberto G. Quercia & George C.
Galster, The Challenges Facing Housing Authorities in a Brave New World, 8 HOuSING PotY
DEBATE 535, 537 (1997); NAT'L HousING LAW PROJECT, HUD HousING PROGRAMS: TE-
NANTS' RIGHTS 1/6 (3d ed. 2004). This would be true even if all public and subsidized units
were located in these neighborhoods. However, subsidized housing developments are not as
concentrated in High and Extreme Poverty neighborhoods as pubic housing developments.
84 This is already partly true as home values tend to be lower in blighted neighborhoods.
See Harkness & Newman, supra note 69, at 598 ("[T]he early pioneer homeowners would
derive little or no benefit and in fact may bear considerable costs, such as low property values,
high crime rates, poor schools, [etc.]").
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borhoods, some emerging middle-class homebuyers would be expected
to find homeownership in poor communities an acceptable option.
Additionally, given the attractiveness of owning a home and the
ever increasing cost of rent, I suspect that many emerging middle-class
families would prefer to purchase a house in a poor neighborhood as
opposed to remaining tenants. 85 From an investment standpoint, owning
rather than renting is substantially more attractive. 86 Particularly for
families on the cusp of affording their first home, if home values in
blighted neighborhoods truly reflected the conditions of the surrounding
community, prices would be low enough to allow many tenants to be-
come homeowners.
However, the emerging middle class's prospect of purchasing a rel-
atively inexpensive home in a blighted neighborhood is thwarted by the
operation of the absentee landlord industry. Since absentee landlords, by
definition, do not live on the property, they do not factor in the aversion
to living in the blighted neighborhood when they value a property. In-
stead, an absentee landlord determines the home's value by calculating
the neighborhood's demand for low quality housing and the resultant fair
market value of rent.87 Since low-income tenants have few housing op-
tions (principally limited to inner-city slum neighborhoods), their rent
payments may remain high even as the quality of the neighborhood
declines.
In a blighted neighborhood with high concentrations of poverty and
consequently, high demand for low quality housing, the financial advan-
tage of purchasing a home is skewed in favor of the absentee landlord.
Consider a multi-family house with three residential apartments of com-
parable quality. Two people are considering purchasing the house, one
person intends on residing there (a potential "resident landlord") and the
85 See ANDREW CAPLIN, HOUSING PARTNERSHIPS: A NEW APPROACH TO A MARKET AT A
CROSSROADS (1997) 24-28 (discussing the many benefits of homeownership).
86 Id.; see also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS, Special Report: Buying a
New Home: A Solid Investment (1998) (finding that if two identical families invested $16,800,
one in a home and the other in the stock market, the homeowner would realize a net return
more than two times that of the renter); The economic benefits of homeownership may not
necessarily be a function of the average return on investment. As commentators note, the
benefits of homeownership may accrue from forcing owners to save for the future. See Ed-
ward Scanlon, Homeownership and its Impacts: Implications for Housing Policy For Low-
Income Families 5 (Ctr. For Soc. Dev., Washington Univ., Working Paper No. 96-2, 1996)
("[H]omeowner median net wealth in the United States is $78,400 while for renters it is
$2,300."); Nicolas P. Retsinas & Belsky, Examining the Unexamined Goal, in LOW-INCOME
HOMEOWNERSHIP: EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL 1, 9 (Nicholas P. Retsinas & Eric S.
Belsky eds., 2002) (qualifying data that housing has a lower historical return on investment
than stocks and bonds by noting that the low-income renter is hard-pressed to save and may
see a host of financial benefits in owning.).
87 Specifically, an absentee landlord will calculate the value of a home as a function of
the expected yearly rental income.
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other intends on residing elsewhere (a potential "absentee landlord"). As
reflected by the hypothetical figures in Table 1, the absentee landlord
would view the home as a more valuable investment than would the resi-
dent landlord because the resident landlord would have to factor in her
aversion to living in the neighborhood.
Table 1: Monthly Rental Income Before Rent Control
Monthly Rental Income
Description
Absentee Landlord Resident Landlord
Unit 1 $800 $500
Unit 2 $800 $800
Unit 3 $800 $800
Total $2400 $2100
The $800 amount reflects the fair market value of the apartment
units. The $500 amount for the resident landlord corresponding to "Unit
1" reflects the value that she would assign to the unit given that she must
live in the blighted neighborhood. The reduced amount reflects the aver-
sion that the owner, who has the ability to live in a more comfortable and
stable neighborhood, would have to living amongst the high concentra-
tion of poverty and the social problems it produces.
In Table 1, the difference of $300 in the monthly value would capi-
talize into a roughly $36,000 difference in the value of the home. 88 The
different values would yield double demand curves causing the absentee
landlord's demand, DAbs, to be above and to the right of the resident
landlord's, DRes. See Figure 1.
88 $300 x 12 months = $3,600 per year; $3,600/10% = $36,000. A similar computation
is discussed by Stephen E. Barton, The Success and Failure of Rent Control in Berkeley,
California, in RENT CONTROL, supra note 4, at 88, 95 (citing Thomas S. Nesslein, The Effects
of Rent Control: An Analytical Reassessment and the Experiences of Berkeley and Santa
Monica, California, 1980-1990 (1992) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington)).
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All things being equal, the absentee landlord would value the home
at level PAbs, which is $36,000 above the prospective resident landlord's
value, PRes. 90 This gives absentee landlords a sizeable advantage, which
they will use to systematically outbid prospective resident landlords for
the home.91
To drive home the importance of intervening in order to attract
more resident landlords, consider the outlook for declining neighbor-
hoods without the proposed rent control scheme. If the number of low-
income people living in a neighborhood increases, a rental home be-
comes progressively more valuable to the absentee landlord. For in-
stance, if there are more poor people in the neighborhood, demand for
low quality rental units may increase. The increased demand would push
rents higher and make the investment more attractive to the absentee
landlord. Simply put, the more poor people in the neighborhood, the
more the absentee landlord can charge in rent. Since absentee landlords
need not live amongst the "concentration effects" and the social disloca-
89 In this and the following figures, the slope of the resident and absentee landlords'
demand curves will be assumed to be identical. However, because absentee landlords
represent more of an investor class whereas resident landlords represent a first-time
homebuyer, lower-middle class household, it can be expected that prospective resident
landlords' demand will be more sensitive to home prices. In other words, in a more
sophisticated model, resident landlords' demand curves will be flatter relative to absentee
landlords' demand curves.
90 $300 x 12 months = $3,600 per year; $3,600/10% = $36,000. See sources cited supra
note 88.
91 Many other factors might contribute to absentee landlords' financial advantage. These
include greater access to capital, greater expertise in the housing market, and heightened skills
for repairs and maintenance.
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tion that accompany high poverty rates, the absentee landlord only stands
to gain by the increased concentration of poverty. 92
However, under the same scenario, the home becomes progressively
less valuable to the resident landlord. She is surrounded by poverty and
as crime increases, the schools get worse, and the homes fall into disre-
pair, her aversion to living in the neighborhood increases and causes her
to assign a lower value to the home. Consequently, the resident landlord
assigns a lower value to the home than the absentee landlord, widening
the distance between points PAbS and PRes in Figure 1. Whenever the
home goes on the market, the absentee landlord will likely purchase the
home and the neighborhood will be deprived of the stabilizing presence
of a higher-income homeowner. Repeated over time, this dynamic will
result in an ever-increasing number of absentee landlords and will cause
neighborhoods to progressively destabilize as the number of poor people
grows. This is precisely what is known as a "downward spiral."'93
A neighborhood with high absentee landlord rates, high concentra-
tions of poverty, high crime, underperforming schools, and deteriorating
homes is costly to society.94 "The lower the average income of a city's
residents, the more needy that community is for funds to provide its re-
sidents with welfare services and police protection - but the less able it is
to generate these funds from its own resources. '95 These costly, yet es-
sential, government services are subsidized by tax payers living within
92 The obvious response to this argument is that absentee landlords do in fact care about
the conditions of the neighborhood. If the neighborhood falls into a downward tailspin, the
absentee landlord can lose rental revenue through the diminished demand for rental units.
Therefore, the argument would go, the absentee landlord would care very deeply about the
conditions of the neighborhood and would therefore have an incentive to invest in the mainte-
nance and stability of the neighborhood. For a persuasive refutation of this argument, see
Duncan Kennedy, The Effects of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income Housing: "Milk-
ing" and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485 (1987) (arguing that it may be rational
for landlords to under-maintain their rental buildings in declining, slum neighborhoods);
HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 188 (Roger Montgomery & Daniel R.
Mandelker, eds., 2d ed. 1979) (suggesting that application of the game theory prisoners' di-
lemma supports lack of incentive for neighborhood homeowners to rehabilitate).
93 The term "downward spiral" is used to describe a pattern of destabilizing feedback
whereby a set of factors induce outcomes that further destabilize a system. Myrdal refers to
this dynamic as "vicious circle." See infra text accompanying notes 154-58.
94 See Gorz, supra note 9, at 29 ("Neighborhoods of highly concentrated poverty pro-
duce negative community-level effects for cities. Obviously, high-poverty neighborhoods suf-
fer from lack of private capital investment. At the same time, they create high service burdens
for core governments. These two effects mutually reinforce each other, since disinvestment
reduces property values, in turn reducing revenue for city government. Pack suggests that the
increased social problems brought on by concentrated poverty in central-city neighborhoods
lead to increased public costs. Her study of large American cities shows that those with high
poverty levels have higher per capita expenditures for most municipal functions." (internal
citations omitted)).
95 NEWMAN, supra note 44, at 82.
[Vol. 17:1
2007] LANDLORDS, RENT CONTROL AND HEALTHY GENTRIFICATION 25
and beyond the neighborhood's borders. 96 Housing, welfare, and medi-
cal subsidies must be paid by the public, along with those expenses asso-
ciated with police protection and the criminal justice system. 97
Additionally, the human cost of reducing someone's dreams of a suc-
cessful life to a distant probability should be considered. 98 In terms of
current costs, it is unquestionable that high-poverty neighborhoods are
expensive for society, but when one considers the propensity of such
neighborhoods to perpetuate themselves, it becomes clear that these ex-
penses will only endure and grow over time.99 As a policy matter, it
appears to make economic sense to intervene in the low-income housing
market in order to decrease the costs associated with high poverty rates.
Additionally, by integrating the poor and better preparing them to partici-
pate in mainstream social and economic life, they can be converted from
net tax receivers into net tax payers.
My proposed rent control scheme aims to improve neighborhoods,
increase home values, decrease poverty, and lower social costs by intro-
ducing more resident landlords to blighted neighborhoods. It is specifi-
cally designed to offset the systematic financial advantage that absentee
landlords enjoy over prospective resident landlords. By increasing the
resident landlord rate, the neighborhood will improve and thus reduce
prospective homebuyers' aversion to living there. If designed properly,
rent control can cause a "cumulative upward movement" 100 in living
96 It is estimated that in 1992, the federal government alone spent over $700 billion on
welfare programs such as income assistance, social insurance, and education and training. See
Gary Burtless, Public Spending on the Poor, in CONFRONTING POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR
CHANGE 57, (Danziger et al. eds., 1994).
97 See U.S. Census Bureau, Finances of County Governments: 2002, 4 GOV'T. FIN. 9
(Feb. 2005) (finding that between 2001-2002, U.S. government agencies spent approximately
$33 billion on public welfare, including $7.4 billion on cash and assistance, and $1.2 billion on
medical vendor payments); see also Laurie E. Felland et al., Health Care Access for Low-
Income People: Significant Safety Net Gaps Remain, ISSUE BRIEF No. 84 (Ctr. for Studying
Health System Change, Wash., D.C.), June 2004, available at http://www.hschange.com/
CONTENT/682/682.pdf (noting that by 2002, twenty-nine states had reduced their funding for
mental health agencies and Medicare mental health services because of the financial strains
placed on states' budgets).
98 See Michael R. Greenberg, Improving Neighborhood Quality: A Hierarchy of Needs,
10 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 601, 602 (1999) ("To live in a blighted environment is dispiriting,
demeaning, and profoundly dehumanizing. Ugliness spreads, ... [and] people flee before it,
leaving wasteland behind them.").
99 Jason C. Booza et al., Where Did They Go?: The Decline of Middle-Income Neighbor-
hoods in Metropolitan America, THE BROOV'NGS INSTITUTE 1 (Living Cities Census Series,
June 2006) (finding that middle-income neighborhoods as a proportion of all metropolitan
neighborhoods have declined from 1970 to 2000, while low-income and high-income neigh-
borhoods have increased during that same period).
100 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN APPROACH TO THE ASIAN DRAMA: METHODICAL AND THEORET-
ICAL 1846 (1970) (describing "cumulative upward movement" as the dynamic under which a
person has acquired the capacity to produce ever-increasing benefits for himself).
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standards over time, deconcentrate poverty, and convert blighted neigh-
borhoods into healthy and stable ones.
II. A PROPOSED RENT CONTROL PLAN TO ENCOURAGE AN
INFLUX OF RESIDENT LANDLORDS
Rent control can be used as a tool to introduce a middle-income
homeowner presence into blighted, inner-city neighborhoods with high
rates of poverty. With time, rent control may even eliminate the exis-
tence of blighted neighborhoods by preventing the concentration of poor
people and its deleterious effects. In short, rent control can transform
blighted, urban neighborhoods into healthy and prosperous ones.
To this end, I propose the following rent control scheme that maxi-
mizes the benefits of rent control while limiting, and in some cases
preventing, the drawbacks associated with traditional rent control.
A. THE BASICS OF THE PROPOSED RENT CONTROL PLAN
In this section, I will consider the effects on the local housing mar-
ket of applying a rent ceiling only to absentee landlords. In my analysis,
I will assume that the locality's implementation plan will make rent ceil-
ings immediately applicable to absentee landlords' homes.10 1 I predict
that this rent control plan will lead to more home-buying by prospective
resident landlords.
Consider the same multi-family house from the previous section.
Now, however, under a rent control regime that imposes a rent ceiling on
the absentee landlord, the financial advantage shifts in favor of the resi-
dent landlord. For example, if the rent ceiling is set at $500 for the ab-
sentee landlord and the resident landlord is able to charge market rents of
$800, the monthly rental income stream for each potential purchaser will
be as reflected in Table 2.
101 An alternative would be to make rent ceilings applicable to absentee landlords' homes
only after a home is sold. This would ensure that whenever the home goes on the market, a
resident landlord will be the likely purchaser. However, this implementation plan would not
push existing absentee landlords to place their homes on the market because their investments,
in terms of monthly rental income, would remain unaffected. However, a plan that makes rent
ceilings immediately applicable to existing absentee landlord homes would have very different
consequences as it would cause these absentee landlords to immediately realize lower monthly
rental income.
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Table 2: Monthly Rental Income After Rent Control
Description Monthly Rental Income
Absentee Landlord Resident Landlord
Unit 1 $500 $500102
Unit 2 $500 $800
Unit 3 $500 $800
Total $1500 $2100
Given these hypothetical figures, the rent ceiling causes the absentee
landlord's monthly rental income to be $600 below the resident land-
lord's, and this $600 difference capitalizes into a quite substantial
$72,000 difference in the value of the home. 10 3
Under this scenario, the different income streams would again pro-
duce a double demand curve for the same property. However, this time,
the absentee landlord's demand curve, DAbs, has slid below and to the left
of the resident landlord's, DRes. See Figure 2.
Additionally, within a relatively short time span, a neighborhood
with rent control may be transformed from one with a bleak outlook to
one with renewed interest given its higher rate of resident landlords.
This not only improves the residents' perceptions of the neighbor-
hood,104 but also the new resident landlords' as they will likely increase
the value of other properties in that area.10 5 Therefore, the possibility of
a community filled with resident landlords will entice prospective home
buyers to consider purchasing a home in the rent-controlled neighbor-
hood. 106 If people believe that an increased homeownership rate will
102 This figure reflects the value a homeowner would assign to the unit if she intends to
live in the home. The reduced amount reflects the aversion this homebuyer would feel towards
living in the home being purchased.
103 $600 x 12 months = $7,200 per year; $7,200/10% = $72,000. See supra note 88.
104 ROLF GOETZE, UNDERSTANDING NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: THE ROLE OF EXPECTA-
TIONS IN URBAN REvITALIZATION 31-33 (1979) (stating that perceptions of a neighborhood are
as important as household income and housing conditions for predicting neighborhood
investment).
105 See Rohe & Stewart, supra note 70.
106 If the marginal cost of purchasing a home in a higher quality neighborhood is greater
than the marginal value of living in that better neighborhood, people would forgo their
purchasing options there and decide to purchase in the blighted neighborhood, of which re-
sidents and potential purchasers may have an improved perception (due to an increase in the
homeownership rate). See GOET7E, supra note 104.
Additionally, if the proposed rent control scheme reduces the value of the homes, it may
allow families who were formerly on the cusp of affording a home to now become homeown-
ers in this neighborhood. In this way, middle-income and emerging middle-income house-
holds can be induced to move into formerly blighted, slum neighborhoods rather than follow
the traditional path towards the suburbs or a "better" neighborhood. If potential resident land-
lords believe that they will be followed into the neighborhood by other resident landlords,
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improve the neighborhood, the demand curve for prospective resident
landlords, DR,,, will shift upwards and to the right. 10 7 See Figure 2.
FIGURE 2
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After this shift, resident landlords will demand a higher quantity of
homes in the rent control neighborhood and will pay a higher price than
absentee landlords. This creates a systematic financial advantage for
prospective resident landlords to purchase the homes whenever they are
put up for sale.
1. Setting the Rent Ceiling
The critical question that each locality must answer when it enacts
this rent control scheme is: "At what amount should the rent ceiling be
set?" The answer to this question depends on two components: the mini-
mum and maximum departure from the fair market rent.
Before determining the minimum and maximum departures from
fair market rent, the expected demand from prospective resident land-
lords must be firmly established and the demand curve, DRes, drawn. 10 8
purchasing a home in a blighted neighborhood might also be an attractive long-term invest-
ment strategy.
107 This would occur by an increase to the value assigned to the unit into which the
resident landlord will move. If prospective resident landlords have a more positive outlook for
neighborhood because of the increase in resident landlords, there will be less aversion to living
there. Therefore, the $500 amount from the "resident landlord" column in Table 2 would
increase to, say, $600.
108 The demand curve for resident landlords, DR,, may be drawn by local real estate
economists. By gathering historical purchasing and sales data within a given neighborhoods a
baseline can be set to help determine the post-rent control demand curve. While this step in
the process will entail a certain level of imprecision, forecasters should be able to generate
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Once local demand is determined, its curve will provide the basis for the
remaining analysis.
a) Minimum Departure from Fair Market Value
The rent control scheme should, at minimum, decrease rents to the
point where they offset prospective resident landlords' aversions to liv-
ing in a blighted neighborhood. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, a resident
landlord's aversion to living in a blighted neighborhood reduces the
value they assign to a home. The rent ceiling applied to absentee land-
lords should be sufficiently below fair market value to force them to
internalize the conditions of the neighborhood into the value of the home
in the same way that a prospective resident landlord does. Once the
value attributed to the homebuyer's aversion is accounted for, the home
should become more valuable to the prospective resident landlord. This
will occur because prospective resident landlords will qualify for federal
and local subsidies, such as tax deductions, which would certainly make
the home more valuable to them.10 9 I speculate that these subsidies will
compensate for inherent advantages that absentee landlords may have,
such as greater access to capital, more expertise in the housing market,
and heightened repair and maintenance skills. Thus, prospective resident
landlords will have a systematic financial advantage over absentee
landlords. 110
b) Maximum Departure from Fair Market Value
As for ascertaining the maximum departure from fair market values,
the calculation depends on the number of homes that will go on the mar-
ket after rent control is enacted. There are two ways that this can be
controlled: 1) setting the rent ceiling at a moderate level and 2) limiting
the number of homes subject to rent control.
reasonably accurate estimates. As discussed infra, the proposed plan would certainly involve
an implementation learning curve, but with more experience with the neighborhood response
to this rent control plan, the resident landlord demand curve may be drawn with ever greater
accuracy.
109 Federal, state and local governments already provide substantial subsidies for home-
owners. These subsidies, it is argued, provide resident landlords with financial advantages that
absentee landlords do not qualify for, such as tax deductions. I do not dispute this point,
however, this makes the proposed rent control scheme no less urgent. The existing "subsidies"
for resident landlords do not require that they purchase homes in blighted neighborhoods,
thereby allowing them to purchase homes in more stable areas. Rather, the proposed rent
control scheme is designed to give prospective resident landlords incentives to purchase homes
in the blighted neighborhoods that they would ordinarily bypass.
1O If the rent ceilings are not sufficiently below fair market value, there will be little or
no incentive for absentee landlords to sell their properties. Thus, it is key that any plan avoid
this result as insufficient values may produce problems comparable to those of traditional rent
control schemes, thereby causing more harm than good. Last, the financial advantage for
resident landlords must be sufficient to cover transaction costs.
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Once absentee landlords are subject to rent ceilings, the value of
their investment properties will fall. Those who purchased their homes
at the highest prices will suffer operating losses whereby their costs, such
as mortgage payments, debt service, and regular maintenance, will be
higher than the controlled rental income. Facing a small or negative re-
turn on their investment, these absentee landlords will place their homes
on the market, particularly since prospective resident landlords will still
place a relatively high value on the homes (because they have the ability
to charge market rents). The absentee landlord-owned homes on the
market may cause a sudden spike in the supply of homes for sale within
the neighborhood. The increased supply of homes for sale is depicted in
Figure 3.
FIGURE 3
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Under rent control, the original supply curve will shift to the right,
now depicted as SRC. This shift will change the quantity (QRes) of homes
resident landlords demand and the price (PReS) they will pay. Using the
new equilibrium point for resident landlords, the values assigned to the
home by resident and absentee landlords can be compared. So long as
PRe, remains above PAbS, the rent control scheme will be effective.11"'
Notice that in Figure 3, the pre-rent control supply curve, S, is used
to determine the value an absentee landlord assigns to a home. Regard-
11 I Note that the value to the resident landlord (PRs) must be sufficiently above the value
to absentee landlords (PA) to cover transaction costs. Cooter defines "transaction costs" as
"the cost of communications among the parties (including the value of time used up in sending
messages), making side payments (the cost of the transaction, not the value of what is ex-
changed), and the cost of excluding people from sharing in the benefits exchanged by the
parties." See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, II J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14-20 (1982).
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less of the supply of homes available on the market, the home will retain
a minimum value to the absentee landlord based on the expected rental
income stream; this point is represented by the intersection of DAbs and
the original supply curve, S. In other words, the expected rental income
will singularly determine the minimum value an absentee landlord as-
signs to a home. Therefore, the value to the absentee owner will not fall
below the PAb, point in Figure 3.112
It is crucial that the value to resident landlords (PRes) remain above
the value to absentee landlords (PAbs), otherwise the homes will either not
be sold or will be sold to another absentee landlord. If the rent ceilings
are too severe, being an absentee landlord will become an unprofitable
venture across the board and many absentee landlords will place their
homes on the market. If this happens, absentee landlord-owned homes
will flood the market and cause the supply curve to shift to the far right.
Once the supply of homes on the market passes a certain point, the resi-
dent landlord's equilibrium point will produce a price (PRes) below that of







In Figure 4, the supply of homes for sale has increased so much that
resident landlords now value the home below absentee landlords. This
result would prevent sales to resident landlords and may produce a fur-
ther destabilization of the neighborhood. If the rent ceilings are set too
112 This should be true unless the absentee landlord has to sell the home for other reasons.
If the absentee landlord already plans on putting the home on the market, then the value that he
will receive will depend on the supply of homes available. However, where the absentee
wishes to remain in the absentee landlord business, it would not maximize his profits to sell
the home to someone who values it below PAIb,.
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low, potentially all of the absentee landlord-owned homes in the neigh-
borhood could go on sale, and this number could be greater than the
number of willing and able purchasers. Any unsold absentee landlord-
owned homes would likely fall into disrepair as rental income would not
cover regular repairs and maintenance. Since ownership would not
change hands from absentee landlords to resident landlords, the only re-
sult would be to reduce the rent burden of tenants. In other words, the
practical effect of this scheme would be similar to traditional rent control
laws and should therefore be avoided. 113
Policymakers can readily avoid this problem by either setting the
rent ceiling at a moderate level or by limiting the number of homes sub-
ject to rent control. As shown in the preceding paragraphs, setting the
rent ceiling too low or too high is fraught with negative consequences.
Therefore, policymakers should strive to find the appropriate moderate
rent ceiling that provides sufficient incentives for absentee landlords to
sell and gives prospective resident landlords the sufficient financial ad-
vantage to purchase the property.
The second method of restricting the supply of homes on the market
is accomplished by limiting the number of homes covered by rent con-
trol. Instead of applying rent control throughout an entire neighborhood,
it can be limited to a few streets or blocks. This would undoubtedly
lower the number of homes placed on the market and should not signifi-
cantly affect the demand for homes within the neighborhood. 1 4 This
would ensure that the supply curve did not shift too far to the right and
cause PReS to fall below PAbS. Although this approach may not produce
the desired results of introducing a substantial number of middle-class
homeowners throughout the neighborhood, it may make sense for cities
to initially limit the scope of the rent control scheme to a small area. By
beginning slowly, municipalities can develop the institutional skills nec-
essary to set the rent ceiling at the appropriate level and forecast the
resultant demand and supply. An initial small scale project will allow
localities to develop a learning curve that will eventually allow them to
extend rent control to larger areas.
113 This result would essentially make this rent control plan similar to all other rent con-
trol laws. By reducing rents and doing nothing else, the housing market would become less
profitable. When this happens, fewer resources are dedicated to maintaining existing units and
to producing new ones. Over the long term, the reduced supply of residential units will in-
crease rental costs and may eventually hurt the very people it was intended to benefit. On
these points, I very much agree with the critics of rent control. See Epstein, supra note 1, at
767; G. Samuel Zucker, Insurance for Eviction Without Cause: A Middle Path for Tenant
Tenure Rights and a New Remedy for Retaliatory Eviction, 28 URB. LAWYER 113, 118 (1996).
114 However, limiting the number of homes subject to rent control might cause a slight
reduction in demand as one would expect fewer resident landlords would move into the neigh-
borhood. Thus, it would nullify whatever boost to demand prospective resident landlords'
belief that they would be followed into the neighborhood by other resident landlords provided.
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2. Targeted to Blighted Neighborhoods
Rent control should be enacted in a city's most blighted neighbor-
hoods. Throughout the literature on rent control, commentators assume
that rent control must be adopted at the city- or town-wide level. Tradi-
tionally, those in favor or rent control argue that it "protect[s] low-in-
come households from rent increases" and thereby alleviates poverty. 115
With this goal in mind, it seems logical to bestow the benefits of rent
control upon all of the poor within the municipality's boundaries. How-
ever, the proposed rent control scheme maintains an entirely different
goal; namely, to revitalize blighted neighborhoods by introducing a mid-
dle- and working-class, homeowner presence. Therefore, rent control
will be most effective when targeted to communities particularly in need
of revitalization, rather than to the entire city or town.
A "blighted" neighborhood, as I define it, is characterized by high
poverty rates, underachieving public schools, and most importantly, high
absentee landlord rates. Residents in these neighborhoods tend to have
the lowest levels of education 1 6 and political participation and are there-
fore typically unable to engage the local political institutions to work to
their advantage. 117 Being mostly relegated to the status of "renters" as
opposed to "homeowners," these residents do not build equity in their
home, move relatively frequently, and thus do not acquire the incentives
to invest time, energy and money into improving the long-term outlook
of the neighborhood.' t 8 The result is a vicious cycle of poverty that is
exceedingly difficult for a neighborhood to break because each genera-
tion is progressively less equipped to garner the educational, social, and
economic resources necessary to break free.
Local legislative or administrative bodies must determine which
neighborhoods are most in need of rent control. These bodies must as-
certain which neighborhood will benefit the most from the introduction
115 DowNs, supra note 1, at 15.
116 Bishaw, supra note 83, at 5 (explaining that education levels increase as neighborhood
poverty declines, and that in neighborhoods with the following poverty rates, "over 40%,"
"less than 40%," "less than 20%," and "less than 12.3%," the percentage of residents with
college or higher education is 8.6%, 11.6%, 15.4%, and 27.5%, respectively); Lawrence 0.
Picus, Current Issues in Public Urban Education, 7 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 715, 715-16
(1996) ("The dropout rate is often considerably higher in central city districts. Many of these
districts have higher concentrations of disabled students who require access to specialized, and
hence extensive, services. These and other factors often lead to lower student achievement in
these [central city, high-poverty] districts.").
117 ROBERT D. DIE-z, HOMEOWNERSHIP ALLIANCE, THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
HOMEOWNERSHIP 6 (2003), available at http://www.newtowncdc.org/pdf/so-
cial-consequences-study.pdf ("One consistent finding concerning homeownership is that
homeowners tend to vote more often. . . the homeowner voter rate is 69%, while the renter
voting rate is 44%. This is consistent with the notion that homeowners are more concerned
with local affairs and national policy than renters due to their stakeholder status as owners.").
118 DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 8.
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of a middle- and working-class homeowner presence, and they can be
assisted in this task by using Duncan Kennedy's definitions regarding
neighborhood change. Kennedy has identified four types of neighbor-
hood change that occur in urban housing markets:
" "upward filtering"-low-income people are moving in and
higher-income people are moving out, values are unstable, and
density is increasing;
" "downward tailspin"-many higher-income people are moving
out and the remaining population is becoming homogeneously
lower income, values are declining, and density is decreasing;
* "upgrading in place"-there is "new investment by low or
lower middle income owners, without displacement of low in-
come tenants, along with new construction for higher-income in-
movers," values are increasing, and density is increasing;
" "gentrification"-higher income people move in, owners rehab
existing structures, and lower income people are displaced,"
neighborhood is becoming homogeneously upper income, values
are increasing, and density is decreasing.1 19
Policymakers should identify which neighborhoods are undergoing
"upward filtering" or "downward tailspin" and convert them into ones
that are "upgrading in place." Specifically, policymakers should target
neighborhoods that are experiencing a loss of higher-income households
and/or an influx of lower-income households. By encouraging the emerg-
ing middle-class to invest in these neighborhoods, while at the same time
avoiding displacement of the existing low income tenants, rent control
can give a neighborhood the most desirable change dynamic: "upgrading
in place," in which the neighborhood improves and poor people gain.
Although I believe that the proposed rent control scheme will bene-
fit blighted neighborhoods the most, the proposed plan may be used to
prevent neighborhoods from falling into "blighted" status. If vigilant
policymakers notice a steady climb in the number of absentee landlords
on a given street, block, neighborhood, or district, rent control can be
used to reverse that trend. In this way, rent control can also serve as a
prophylactic measure to prevent the transition to a "downward tailspin."
3. Targeted to Neighborhoods with a High Rate of 2- to 4-Unit
Homes
The proposed rent control plan will prove successful in those neigh-
borhoods where a high rate of resident landlords would have a significant
119 Duncan Kennedy, Legal Economics of U.S. Low Income Housing Markets in Light of
"Informality" Analysis, 4 J. L. Soc'y 71, 72-73 (2002).
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impact on residents. However, not every neighborhood maintains the
housing stock necessary to produce these results. For instance, families
living in large apartment buildings with dozens of units (typical in New
York City) will not benefit as much by the presence of resident landlords
as would a family in a 2-unit home. If the average building in a blighted
neighborhood has twenty residential units, one of which is occupied by
the owner and the rest by low-income tenants, there will be a 5% rate of
(presumably) middle-income households. 120 If the average building in a
blighted neighborhood has two residential units, one of which is occu-
pied by the owner and the other by low-income tenants, there will be a
50% rate of (presumably) middle-income households. It is unknown
what rate, or critical mass, of resident landlords is required to produce
the benefits discussed in Part I, but it is likely that the benefits derived
from the close proximity of low- and middle-income households will not
materialize if the middle-income presence is exceedingly small.
2 1
Therefore, I propose that rent control be enacted only in neighbor-
hoods with a high percentage of two-, three-, and four-family homes.
Virtually every state in the Northeast and Midwest, along with numerous
others across the country, has blighted neighborhoods that contain a suf-
ficient percentage of two-, three-, and four-family homes. 122 Cities such
120 This analysis ignores the fact that the homeowners of the larger buildings would prob-
ably belong to a higher socioeconomic class than the homeowners of the smaller buildings. If
this factor were considered, I speculate that it would provide another argument against apply-
ing rent control to the larger buildings. The larger landlords would be more likely to be pro-
fessional landlords who do not hold a traditional job with steady hours and are less likely to
serve as a model of "behaviors and attitudes that are conducive to success in both school and
work." Ainsworth, supra note 48, at 119. Thus, one of the greatest benefits of attracting
higher-income households to the neighborhood would not materialize. In addition, if the
larger landlord is significantly better off than the rest of the neighborhood's residents there
could be a sentiment of hostility and resentment against the landlord. Not only would this
create an un-neighborly environment but it may significantly discourage these homeowners
from residing on the premises. This would have a significant chilling effect and may deter the
production of large rental buildings even in areas without rent control.
121 Determining the optimal homeowner percentage is beyond the scope of this article.
However, sociologists and empirical researchers may help to address this question. Unfortu-
nately, only a limited amount of research has been directed to this area; I am hopeful that this
article along with the growing body of literature on the impact of homeownership rates on
neighborhoods will help generate greater interest in this topic.
122 According to the 2000 Census, the following large cities were comprised of a housing
stock where over 20% of the homes were 2- to 4-unit homes and they had poverty rates over
20%: Hartford and New Haven, CT; Fort Pierce, FL; Chicago, IL; New Orleans, LA; Law-
rence and Springfield, MA; St. Louis, MO; Newark, New Brunswick, and Patterson, NJ; Al-
bany, Buffalo, Newburgh, New York City, Rochester, and Syracuse, NY; Cincinnati and
Cleveland, OH; Lancaster, PA; Providence, RI; College Station, TX; and Milwaukee, WI.
Analysis of 2000 Census Data (on file with author).
Additionally, the following cities' have housing stocks whereby at least 15% of the
homes are 2- to 4-unit homes: Oakland and San Francisco, CA; Fort Lauderdale, FL; Louis-
ville, KY; Worcester, MA,\; Minneapolis, MN; Atlantic City, Jersey City, and Long Branch,
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as Chicago, Cleveland, Hartford, Newark, Oakland, Providence, St.
Louis and many others would be ideally suited.123
Admittedly, this proposal is not designed to address the extreme
forms of concentrated poverty found in large public housing develop-
ments. However, residential neighborhoods surrounding public housing
developments would likely benefit from the proposed rent control
scheme. The stability that higher-income resident landlords provide
would presumably help mitigate whatever radiating influence public
housing units may have on a surrounding community.
B. GENTRIFICATION AND DISPLACEMENT
Up until this point, the only changes to traditional rent control laws
that I have discussed are the exemption for resident landlords and the
application of this scheme limited to blighted neighborhoods with a high
percentage of two-, three-, and four-family homes. These features are
expected to encourage absentee landlords to sell their homes in blighted
neighborhoods to middle- and working-class households. Resident land-
lords will replace absentee landlords and will have greater incentives to
maintain and improve their homes, thereby improving blighted neighbor-
hoods and causing rent levels to rise. 124 Poor tenants will face the "op-
tion" of paying more for higher quality housing or moving to
neighborhoods with lower quality housing and lower rents. Undoubt-
edly, many tenants will move, either as a matter of choice or as a matter
of force, and will be replaced by higher-income tenants. 125 This exodus
could usher in a wave of gentrification that would place pressure on
longtime tenants to relocate. While displacement would certainly disad-
vantage low-income tenants, I argue that displacement is actually desira-
ble, so long as the result is a "dispersal" of the poor.
The gentrification caused by the proposed rent control scheme can
lead to the displacement of a blighted neighborhood's residents in three
distinct ways: 1) displacement of homeowners by higher-income
homebuyers; 2) displacement of low-income tenants by in-moving resi-
dent landlords; and 3) direct and indirect displacement of low-income
NJ; Columbus, OH; Allentown, Harrisburg and Pittsburgh, PA; Charleston and Columbia, NC;
San Marcos, TX; Salt Lake City, UT; Norfolk, VA; and Kenosha, WI.
The foregoing data relate to a city's housing stock and poverty rate as a whole. However,
the proposed rent control plan need not be applied to an entire city. As pockets of poverty
develop, rent control may be applied to specific neighborhoods or blocks within a city.
123 Id.
124 See supra Part 1B.
125 See, e.g., Wallace F. Smith, Filtering and Neighborhood Change (1964), reprinted in
HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 162 (Roger Montgomery & Daniel R.
Mandelker eds., 2d ed. 1979) (stating that higher-income tenants have greater housing inten-
sive preferences for higher quality housing and the purchasing power to pay the resulting
premium).
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tenants by higher-income tenants. Before I discuss each gentrifying
pressure that causes displacement, I will give a brief introduction to the
traditional process of gentrification and the types of homeowners that I
predict will purchase homes from absentee landlords. Understanding
how gentrification happens and the expected composition of the neigh-
borhood's homeowners will help predict the impact that the proposed
rent control scheme will have and what kinds of provisions will help
reduce displacement.
1. Traditional Process of Gentrification
There is no agreed definition of gentrification but there are certain
features shared by most definitions.' 2 6 Peter Marcuse provides a clinical
definition that draws particular attention to the social class aspect of
gentrification:
Gentrification occurs when new residents-who dispro-
portionately are young, white, professional, technical,
and managerial workers with higher education and in-
come levels-replace older residents-who dispropor-
tionately are low-income, working-class and poor,
minority and ethnic group members, and elderly-from
older and previously deteriorated inner-city housing in a
spatially concentrated manner, that is, to a degree differ-
ing substantially from the general level of change in the
community or region as a whole.' 27
The process of gentrification is usually slow at first, consisting of a
few urban pioneers moving into a community where both housing quality
and rent levels are low. These early gentrifiers, predominantly tenants
and often artists,1 28 are termed "risk-oblivious" as they are willing to
chance their personal safety in high crime neighborhoods and below
standard buildings.12 9 The depressed neighborhood generally attracts
126 Lance Freeman, Displacement or Succession: Residential Mobility in Gentrifying
Neighborhoods, 40 URB. AH'. REv. 463, 469-470 (2005) (highlighting the common dimen-
sions of the disparate definitions of gentrification, including "(1) central city neighborhoods,
(2) populated by low-income households that have previously experienced (3) disinvestment."
This causes an "(4) influx of the relatively affluent or gentry, and (5) an increase in
investment.").
127 Peter Marcuse, Gentrification, Abandonment, and Displacement: Connections,
Causes, and Policy Responses in New York City, 28 J. URB. & CONrEMP. L. 195, 198-99
(1985).
128 Freeman, supra note 126, at 474 ("Renters whose income may or may not be rising
concomitantly with rental increases may be especially vulnerable to displacement under these
circumstances."); id. at 471 ("[Y]oung artists and professionals who have relatively low in-
comes often pioneer gentrification.").
129 See Robert Kerstein, Stage Model of Gentrification, An Examination, 25 URB. AFF. Q.
620, 621 (1990).
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progressively more pioneers until it eventually reaches a tipping point at
which time gentrification accelerates. 130 Once a sufficient number of pi-
oneers have entered the neighborhood and established neighborhood in-
stitutions (such as bars, cafes or restaurants), the neighborhood becomes
stabilized, and the "risk-averse" middle-class overcomes its initial aver-
sion and begins to move in to the now stabilized area. 131 Once this oc-
curs, the pace of gentrification accelerates as the poorer, longtime
residents are unable to financially compete with the higher-income gen-
trifiers, and may ultimately move. 132 As poor people leave the neighbor-
hood, it becomes progressively more attractive to the risk-averse middle-
class and gentrification prevents low-income tenants from finding afford-
able housing options within the neighborhood. Eventually, the median
socioeconomic status of residents increases and the class character of the
neighborhood is transformed. 1 3 3
2. Likely Class Composition of Rent-Controlled Home
Purchasers
After my suggested rent control plan is enacted, a resident landlord
will value any particular home more than an absentee landlord. Prospec-
tive resident landlords will outbid absentee landlords for homes and will
eventually come to own most, if not all, of the homes in the rent-con-
trolled zone.1 34 However, the kinds of resident landlords expected to
purchase these homes will not represent a random sample of
homebuyers. Rather, I expect that these purchasers will be those individ-
uals least averse to moving into blighted neighborhoods. Most likely,
130 Cf id. at 636 (finding that when risk-averse gentrifiers enter a neighborhood, "the
gentrification process is likely to expand."). Kerstein's comment concerns neighborhoods
where the early in-movers display risk-averse attitudes. Id. However, I suspect that this com-
ment may be generalized because the increased purchasing power of the isk-averse is likely to
raise housing costs and displace the poor. The vacancies left by out-going displacees will
allow for yet more in-moving risk-averse gentrifiers.
131 Id. at 621 (noting that the risk-averse middle class "settle[s] in the neighborhood only
after many other professional and managerial households have already located there and reha-
bilitated their homes substantially").
132 Id.
133 J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 Howard L.J. 405, 406 (2003).
134 The rate at which homeownership changes hands from the absentee landlords to the
resident landlords is completely within the discretion of the local legislature. If the rent ceiling
for absentee landlords is slightly below the market rent level, it will only provide a slight
incentive for absentee landlords to sell and the cost of the house may not be reduced enough
for lower-middle class households to afford. In this case, the change from absentee landlord
ownership to resident landlord ownership is expected to be very slow. However, if the rent
ceiling for absentee landlords is set significantly below the market rent level, there will be a
high incentive for landlords to sell as they would seek to avoid monthly operating losses. A
basic tenet of efficiency analysis dictates that ownership of a resource should lie with the
person who values it the most. After rent control is adopted, virtually all resident landlords
will value the property more than will absentee landlords.
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they will be emerging middle-class households living in the same, simi-
lar, or nearby communities, as opposed to stable middle-class households
living in more peaceful and comfortable suburban settings. 35 Since sta-
ble middle-class households have the greatest aversion to moving into
blighted neighborhoods, they will value the home less than emerging
middle-class households who live in the same or similar neighbor-
hoods.136 Although the empirical data does not exist, I speculate that the
stable middle class's additional purchasing power (which would allow
them to pay a higher price for the home) would be insufficient to com-
pensate for the decreased value they would assign to living in such
homes. At the time of purchase, these homes will be located in a
blighted neighborhood, and I expect that risk-averse stable middle-class
gentrifiers will be reticent about moving into the neighborhood before it
is has been sufficiently "stabilized."' t37 As a result, I predict that emerg-
ing middle- and working-class households will place a greater value on
the home and will not be outbid by the potential gentrifiers of the stable
middle class.
3. Displacement of Homeowners by Higher-Income Homebuyers
After my suggested rent control plan is enacted and the resident
landlord rate increases, it will take some time before the neighborhood
significantly improves. But if rent control is successful at improving the
perception, as well as the health and stability, of the blighted neighbor-
hood, I expect that the demand for homes will increase, even among the
risk-averse middle class.
If there is a high percentage of resident landlords in the neighbor-
hood, it will be very difficult for gentrification to displace existing re-
sidents. The displacement of homeowners as a result of gentrification is
very different than that of tenants. 138 Regarding homeownership, as the
neighborhood improves and becomes more appealing to potential gen-
trifiers, it will also become more appealing to the resident homeowners
and may induce them to remain in the neighborhood.' 39 In fact, evidence
135 Kerstein, supra note 129, at 622 (finding a "steady increase in the percentage of in-
movers from suburban [communities]" and that "increasing proportions of in-movers will be
from the suburbs than from other neighborhoods within the city").
136 Id. (stating that "financially better-off families, more so than individuals and couples,
tend to avoid neighborhoods that they perceive as risky").
137 This prediction is consistent with the analysis of proponents of the Stage Theory of
gentrification. See Kerstein, supra note 129, at 622 (suggesting that stable, middle-class
households will not move into the gentrifying neighborhood until it has been sufficiently
"suburbanized").
138 Freeman, supra note 126, at 476. ("[R]enters would probably be more susceptible to
displacement pressure, because they have much less control over their unit than owners.").
139 It may be argued that in a gentrifying neighborhood, the increased real estate taxes
caused by higher home values will displace homeowners who cannot afford the increase.
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suggests that rather than resulting in displacement, gentrification causes
households to remain in the neighborhood for longer periods of time so
as to take advantage of the improved conditions. 1
40
Existing homeowners that have invested significant time and energy
into maintaining and improving their homes and thereby stabilizing the
neighborhood will logically have developed an attachment to both their
house and the neighborhood. In traditional instances of gentrification,
potential middle-class in-movers need not overcome the strong resistance
that would result from high resident-homeowner rates. Instead, it is rela-
tively easy for them to purchase homes or condominiums from develop-
ers who have in turn purchased the homes from absentee landlords or
from the city via tax sales. When homes are held solely as investment
properties, it is much easier and cheaper to negotiate a purchase because
the owners have not developed a household interest in the home.141 As
the neighborhood improves and attracts more gentrifiers, the remaining
homeowners will have an even greater incentive to stay so as to enjoy the
benefits of an upgraded neighborhood.142
Last, it may be suggested that existing homeowners may be priced
out of the market due to an increase in real estate taxes in a gentrifying
market. However, since I propose that application of this scheme be lim-
ited to neighborhoods with a high percentage of 2-, 3-, and 4-family
homes, it is likely that increased tax expenses will be offset through in-
creased rental income. Therefore, it is unlikely that gentrification as a
result of homeownership will displace existing resident landlords.
4. Displacement of Low-Income Tenants by In-Moving Resident
Landlords
Displacement of the neighborhood's poor tenants, however, is a le-
gitimate concern. The most direct form of displacement will occur as a
result of in-moving resident landlords. When homes are purchased from
absentee landlords, the new homeowners must occupy an apartment to
establish themselves as resident landlords, a prerequisite for charging
However, given the housing stock required for this kind of rent control, any increase in real
estate taxes will likely be offset by an increased rent that resident landlords can charge.
140 Freeman, supra note 126, at 475 (detailing his study based on empirical data compiled
in a neighborhood subject to traditional rent control that found, as a caveat, that the existence
of rent control, and not the gentrifying conditions, may be the primary cause of the longer
resident tenures).
141 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 SrAN. L. REV. 957 (1982)
(arguing that certain property, such as a wedding ring, a portrait, or a house, have a value
beyond what the tradition market will determine. "These objects are closely bound up with
personhood because they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal
entities in the world." If these items are lost, there is perhaps no amount of money that can
replace them.).
142 See generally Freeman, supra note 126.
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higher rents. To secure an apartment, the in-moving landlord must evict
a current tenant. Displacement is an unfortunate, but unavoidable, con-
sequence of the proposed rent control scheme because in order to achieve
the deconcentration of poverty, some poor residents must be forced to
move. Short of building more rental units, the number of tenants must
decrease in order for the number of resident landlords to grow.
This situation presents a problem for advocates and communities
concerned about the displacement of the poor. Since those neighbor-
hoods subject to the proposed rent control scheme are the poorest and
most blighted areas, the rents of displaced tenants would tend to be rela-
tively inexpensive. Thus, it is unlikely that these tenants will be able to
find apartments of comparable quality at equal or lower rents in other
neighborhoods. With the poor already spending a high percentage of
their income on housing, even a slight increase in rent could have a sig-
nificant impact on their economic stability. 143
If community concern is great, the rent control scheme could in-
clude a provision for a modest subsidy to the dislocated poor. For in-
stance, the ordinance could require a one-time payment to those tenants
replaced by the incoming homeowners. The cost of this one-time pay-
ment can be capitalized into the cost of the house and paid directly to the
tenant by the new homeowner. 44 Additionally, the community could
work towards enabling some of the neighborhood's existing tenants to
purchase the homes.
An interesting filtering dynamic arises when incoming landlords re-
place outgoing tenants. Incoming homeowners will likely move from
various parts of the town, city and state. However, all outgoing tenants
will move from the same neighborhood. These outgoing tenants will not
necessarily fill the vacancies left by the incoming homeowners in their
former neighborhoods. Since the new homeowners will be slightly
wealthier and have higher or more stable incomes, they will bear higher
housing-specific preferences 45 that the poorer tenants cannot afford.
This will trigger the filtering process as the vacancies created by the new
homeowners will be filled by a class of tenants with lower housing-spe-
143 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S
HOUSING 2007, at 25, http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2007/son2OO7.pdf
(reporting that 1 in 7 American households spends more than half of its income on housing.
Also, "[iun 2005, households in the bottom quarter of the income distribution (earning $23,000
or less) accounted for 78% of the severely housing cost-burdened.").
144 The cost of this one-time payment will affect the demand and supply curves discussed
supra. However, this payment will be factored into the demand curves as they are being
drawn. Thus, the foregoing analysis will not change.
145 This means that higher-income individuals will prefer and seek out higher-value
homes and rental units. See generally Smith, supra note 125.
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cific preferences. 146 In turn, each vacancy in higher quality housing will
be filled by tenants from a lower income class who will filter up and
upgrade their housing conditions. 147 Through this upward filtering pro-
cess, the vacancies left by the new homeowners in their former neighbor-
hoods will trickle down and eventually result in an upgrade in housing
quality for poorer tenants.
As the poor filter up into better quality housing, they will become
dispersed among more stable neighborhoods with higher rates of resident
landlords. But to the extent that the poor are simply reconcentrating in
another part of the city, rent control should be applied to that new neigh-
borhood as well. At a meta-level, if all cities and towns apply this pol-
icy, the poor will become dispersed throughout society. The resulting
neighborhood-level interactions of the poor with higher-income house-
holds will prevent their social and spatial isolation and will reduce the
concentration effects that produce great social costs.
This process may have an additional benefit. Displacement by
traditional gentrification replaces existing residents with in-movers from
wealthier communities and often leads to tension and hostility between
the older, poorer residents and the newer, wealthier ones. However, as
mentioned above, it is unlikely that the proposed rent control scheme
would encourage a sudden flurry of in-movers from wealthier communi-
ties into the blighted neighborhood because the risk-averse, middle-class
individuals would not normally be willing to move into the neighborhood
until it has been substantially stabilized by pioneers. A rapid change in
the socioeconomic composition of a neighborhood may lead to tension,
or as it is often called, "class warfare."' 148 However, a change in home-
ownership by a class of landlords whose cultural and socioeconomic
makeup is relatively similar to that of the existing tenants allows for a
smoother, healthier transition.
146 Id.; see also Kennedy, supra note 92, at 486 ("It has long been the case that new
housing becomes available to the poor through trickle down, otherwise known as the filtering
process. As higher income people build new housing for themselves in the suburbs, lower
income people 'filter up' through the existing stock, so that today's poor often live in housing
built for an earlier middle class.")
147 Id.
148 Ian Donnis, Class Warfare in Olneyville: The Strains of a Worsening Statewide Hous-
ing Crisis Erupt on Providence's West Side, THE PROVIDENCE PHOENIX, May 26-June 1, 2006,
at 4; see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, Review: Save the Cities, Stop the Suburbs?, 116 YALE L.J.
598, 611 (2006) ("[Mlany inner-city residents would be happy not to have new neighbors, new
barriers to their views, and new competitors for parking spaces." (quoting Michael H. Schill,
Comment on Richard P. Voith & David L. Crawford's Smart Growth and Affordable Housing,
in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: Do THEY CONFLICT? 102, 104
(Anthony Downs, ed., 2004))).
[Vol. 17:1
2007] LANDLORDS, RENT CONTROL AND HEALTHY GENTRIFICATION 43
5. Displacement of Low-Income Tenants by Higher-Income
Tenants
If the neighborhood improves as a result of an increased homeown-
ership rate, demand for rental units will likely increase, not only among
the young, middle class but among the poor as well. The desire to live in
a healthy and stable neighborhood will push prices upward, especially
since supply will likely not keep pace with the increased demand. 149 The
higher potential rents will cause landlords to prefer tenants willing to pay
the highest premium for better conditions. Not only do wealthier people
have a higher initial preference for housing, but they are also financially
able to outbid their less wealthy counterparts. 50 This process exerts a
not-too-subtle pressure that over time will push the poorest families out
and change the character of the neighborhood.
Similarly, as a neighborhood improves, resident landlords may
come to view the remaining tenants from the pre-rent control era as in-
compatible with the new neighborhood makeup. The activities that were
tolerated under an absentee landlord, such as late night noise, criminal
activity, or drug use, may be at odds under the more watchful eye of a
resident landlord. Put more offensively, the new emerging middle-class
homeowners may view the characteristics and activities of the poor with
fear and hostility. This will lead the resident landlords to exert pressure
on the poorest families to move out of the neighborhood.
Depending on its view of the poor, the local legislature may be glad
that the rent control plan will push the "nefarious" element out of the
neighborhood or it may desire to enact a more comprehensive rent con-
trol scheme that protects the most "vulnerable" element from displace-
ment. If the locality chooses to enact additional tenant protections, they
should guard against indirect displacement caused by increases in rent
and direct displacement caused by evictions. Suggestions for additional
tenant protections are discussed in the Appendix.
Ultimately, I do not expect the transition from a blighted neighbor-
hood to a healthy and stable one to occur overnight. As the homeowner-
ship rate increases, it will take some time before tangible improvements
are realized, particularly for improving the neighborhood's institutions
(e.g., public schools). Thus, the displacement of poor tenants will not
take the form of an immediate and drastic disruption. Rather, given the
already high rates of mobility among tenants, I expect that the effect of
direct displacement (of current tenants by new tenants) will be gradual
149 See Andrejs Skaburskis & Michael B. Teitz, The Economics of Rent Regulation, in
RENT CONTROL, supra note 1, at 57-58 (noting the inability of the housing market to meet the
large spikes in demand for low-priced housing in the short term).
150 See generally Smith, supra note 125.
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and largely indiscernible.15' However, as tenants naturally cycle through
apartments, it is expected that finding new apartments within a gentrify-
ing neighborhood will become progressively more difficult, and over
time, will cause the neighborhood to change.' 52 As discussed in the fol-
lowing section, this is not necessarily a bad result.
6. Healthy Gentrification
The proposed rent control scheme aims to transform blighted com-
munities into healthy and stable living environments by introducing mid-
dle- and working-class homeowners to the neighborhoods. However, the
ultimate goal is not merely to improve the neighborhood, but rather, to
deconcentrate the poor and bring them closer to mainstream society. If
the poor are displaced and resettle in other neighborhoods of low-quality
housing and high poverty, the problem is not solved, but merely shifted.
This is not the goal of the proposed plan!
In an effort to transform a "vicious cycle" of poverty and depen-
dence into a "virtuous cycle" of stability and independence, local legisla-
tures should adopt laws that develop people's abilities to contribute to
society. 153 Blighted inner-city neighborhoods are riddled with personal,
economic and social underdevelopment in various forms. 154 People fail
to develop the education and expertise required to meaningfully partici-
pate and advance in mainstream society, groups fail to develop job net-
works that connect the unemployed with jobs, and communities fail to
develop stable and supportive social relations.
Gunnar Myrdal explains the process of underdevelopment by
describing the phenomenon of "circular causation" and applying it to the
problem of underdevelopment in Southeast Asia.155 Drawing from
Ragnar Nurkse's theory of the "vicious circle of poverty,"'156 Myrdal rea-
sons a country's state of poverty stems from its own state of poverty.
The circular reasoning goes as follows:
[A] poor man may be weak; being physically weak, his
working capacity may be low which means that he is
poor, which in turn means that he will not have enough
to eat; and so on. A situation of this sort, relating to a
151 Freeman, supra note 126, at 483 (finding that "gentrification does not appear to be
associated with increased mobility or high levels of displacement")
152 Freeman, supra note 126, at 483-84.
153 The concept of the "vicious cycle" is actually referred to as the "vicious circle" by
MYRDAL, supra note 100. I use "vicious cycle" because it suggests a more repetitious and
self-perpetuating process.
154 See supra Part I.
155 MYRDAL, supra note 100, at 1844.
156 RAGNAR NtJRKSE, PROBLEMS OF CAPITAL FORMATION IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUN-
TRIES 4 (1953).
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country as a whole, can be summed up in the trite pro-
position: "a country is poor because it is poor."' 157
The same can be said of local American communities. Without
high homeownership rates, residents of blighted neighborhoods are sur-
rounded by greater numbers of poor households. High poverty rates
breed social problems, and without a strong middle- and working-class
presence, residents are further isolated from the mainstream. This pre-
vents residents from acquiring a quality education and those skills neces-
sary to overcome poverty, and further, deters prospective homebuyers
from moving into the neighborhood. Thus, fewer homeowners are at-
tracted to the neighborhood and poverty increases. The downward spiral
continues ! 158
The focus of advocates for the poor should be on intervening at a
particular point in the vicious cycle that will convert it into a virtuous
cycle that creates "cumulative upward movement" in the living condi-
tions of the poor. 159 It is important to single out the many links in the
chain of causation that compose and perpetuate the cycle of poverty, and
determine the benefits and costs of intervening at any particular point.
Special consideration should be given to the interventions that set in mo-
tion a process that positively influences other links in the chain of
causation.
Advocates for the poor have long sought to address the persistent
underdevelopment in American low-income communities by focusing on
a number of local strategies. These strategies have included providing
greater resources for education, making funds available for economic de-
velopment, and subsidizing the cost of housing. 160 Each of these strate-
gies has produced generally positive results in terms of improving the
immediate condition of the poor, but each has produced mixed results in
addressing the long-term fundamental causes of poverty. 61 These policy
interventions do not address the root causes as they fail to develop the
poor's capacity to determine their own fate at the local neighborhood
level. 162 Without this kind of effect, the "vicious cycle" will never be
converted into a "virtuous" one.
157 MYRDAL, supra note 100, at 1844.
158 See supra Part IA.
159 MYRDAL, supra note 100, at 1844-47.
160 See generally Burtless, supra note 96.
161 Id. at 51 (stating that "many of the most costly social programs do not even aim to
reduce poverty as it is officially defined." These programs have specific and limited objectives
such as "improving diet, basic medical care, and housing conditions.").
162 See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 74 ("Although we are mainly preoccupied with the
welfare outcome for the particular subcategory of poor tenants, we need to recognize at the
outset that this group plays a distinctly subordinate role in generating the neighborhood
changes that largely determine its fate.").
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As I argue in Part I, reintroducing middle- and working-class house-
holds into blighted neighborhoods will not only improve the regular
maintenance and structural integrity of the homes, but it will also social-
ize the poor by helping them to develop language, attitude, education,
and job-related skills required to meaningfully participate in mainstream
society. I speculate that this will occur in an infinite number of ways; I
will discuss a few brief and tangible examples.
First, resident landlords tend to reside in the same unit five times
longer than tenants 163 and generally maintain their homes in better condi-
tions than absentee landlords. 164 Their personal and economic interests
in the home and the neighborhood, along with their longer tenure and
better maintenance, make resident homeowners better able to monitor
and sanction the deviant behavior of neighborhood children. 165 These
homeowners have less tolerance for people who display a destructive
disregard for the aesthetic quality of the neighborhood and refuse to per-
mit littering and graffiti on their property. 166 Generally, resident land-
lords are able to keep a more watchful eye than absentee landlords. The
cumulative effect of an entire neighborhood of homeowners displaying
the same intolerance helps to socialize others to the antisocial nature of
these activities and deters future behavior. The care and maintenance ex-
hibited by resident landlords establishes neighborhood norms and places
social pressure on residents to conform.
Also, middle- and working-class households provide models of
traditional and successful employment habits. 167 Admittedly, the effects
of youth being surrounded by a community of employed adults are diffi-
cult to measure. However, if routine work for the neighborhood's adults
becomes the norm to which youth become accustomed, these adults will
serve as models as they consider whether, when, and how to enter the
163 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, SOCIAL BENEFITS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP AND
STABLE HOUSING 7-8 (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.columbusrealtors.com/Img/pdf/
2455.pdf (Although the report cites other possible explanations for the increased mobility rate
among renters, such as relative youth and marital status, the report nonetheless concludes that
homeownership has a statistically significant impact on lowering the mover rate. Addition-
ally, the mover rate doubles for households living in poverty.); see also William M. Rohe et
al., The Social Benefits and Costs of Homeownership: A Critical Assessment of the Research
21 (Joint Ctr. for Housing Studies of Harvard Univ., Low-Income Homeownership Working
Paper Series, LIHO-01.12, 2001), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/
homeownership/lihoO1 - 12.pdf.
164 See generally GALSTER, supra note 79; Spivack, supra note 79.
165 DIETZ, supra note 117, at 4 ("[D]ue to the financial stake in community conditions,
homeowners are more likely to monitor and correct socially deviant behavior of children, and
perhaps more importantly, adolescents.").
166 See id.
167 See WILSON, supra note 10, at 60-61.
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workforce.1 68 This does not necessarily mean that they will pursue or
find stable jobs, but it does mean that they will be introduced to a model
that reflects mainstream goals.' 69 As Scanlon notes, "the presence of
stable working households will provide role models to central-city re-
sidents that are expected to reinforce mainstream values and behavioral
norms regarding education, employment, and family structure."'1 70 Addi-
tionally, and perhaps most importantly, the presence of employed indi-
viduals helps connect the unemployed to job opportunities that are
advertised primarily by word of mouth. 17'
Lastly, the improvement of education outcomes will ultimately de-
termine whether residents of blighted neighborhoods ever break the
chains of poverty. It is believed that children are the main beneficiaries
of mixed-income housing arrangements as their interactions in school,
the playground, or elsewhere help them to develop social ties with chil-
dren from other social classes. 172 The presence of middle-income house-
holds provides an anchor that deters an oppositional culture from
developing whereby success in school is frowned upon and seldom ex-
pected.1 73 Additionally, for those emerging middle-class families who
168 Id. ("In neighborhoods in which nearly every family has at least one person who is
steadily employed, the norms and behavior patterns that emanate from a life of regularized
employment become part of the community gestalt.").
169 Schill & Wachter, supra note 16, at 1289 ("[C]hildren growing up in neighborhoods
with few employed role models develop weak attachments to the labor force. Lacking em-
ployment opportunities and the appropriate socialization to seek work, youths frequently en-
gage in deviant or illegal activities to earn income and gain status, thereby further distancing
themselves from middle-class norms. These behaviors are reinforced by peer groups. Activi-
ties that are likely to assist them in obtaining employment and social mobility, such as graduat-
ing from high school, are stigmatized rather than valued.").
170 Quercia & Galster, supra note 45, at 417. See also WILSON, supra note 10, at 60-61
("Inner-city social isolation also generates behavior not conducive to good work histories....
[T]he less frequent the regular contact with those who have steady and full-time employment
(that is, the greater the degree of social isolation), the more likely that initial job performance
will be characterized by tardiness, absenteeism, and, thereby low retention.").
171 Quercia & Galster, supra note 45, at 417 (stating that adults with stable jobs may also
provide information about employment opportunities to their neighbors); WILSON, supra note
10, at 60 ("Inner-city isolation makes it much more difficult for those who are looking for jobs
to be tied into the job network. Even in those situations where job vacancies become available
in an industry near or within an inner-city neighborhood, workers who live outside the inner
city may find out about these vacancies sooner than those who live near the industry because
the latter are not tied into the job network.").
172 Smith, supra note 39, at 10 ("Because interaction between children [in mixed income
developments] is more likely than between adult residents, there is a greater chance of signifi-
cant interaction and positive benefits for children.").
173 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 50, at 167 ("The conditions in the ghetto, in short,
make it exceedingly difficult to live up to broader societal values with respect to work, mar-
riage, and family formation, and poor blacks are thus denied the opportunity to build self-
esteem and to acquire prestige through channels valued in the wider society. As a result, an
alternative status system has evolved within America's ghettos that is defined in opposition to
the basic ideals and values of American society. It is a culture that explains and legitimizes the
social and economic shortcomings of ghetto blacks, which are built into their lives by segrega-
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decide to send their children to public schools, the greater public re-
sources that this voting group can leverage will produce benefits that
help all children.
While many inner-city reform measures aim to directly improve the
performance of public schools or to jump-start economic development, it
is important to remember the central idea of Wilson's "concentration ef-
fects" thesis. To Wilson, the structural transformation of the social, eco-
nomic, and demographic composition of the inner city leaves the poor
isolated from mainstream society17 4 thereby preventing the "develop-
ment of cognitive, linguistic, and other educational and job-related skills
necessary for the world of work."'175 If the poor are socially integrated at
the neighborhood-level with middle- and working-class groups, they will
develop the skills and attributes necessary to meaningfully participate in
society and, ultimately, to determine their own fates. And once the poor
genuinely have the tools to do so, they will become part of a process
within which they can improve their own lives. This is what is called a
"virtuous cycle" and this is what I call "healthy gentrification."'176
While gentrification is associated with "outsiders" invading a com-
munity,1 77 the proposed plan encourages the influx of homeowners who
are not so different from the existing residents, thus allowing for a
smoother transition. Even if some existing tenants are displaced, by
combining the literature on concentrated poverty with that on gentrifica-
tion, we see that dispersing and integrating the poor is precisely what is
called for. For the existing tenants who are displaced, so long as locali-
ties can prevent them from re-segregating in other blighted neighbor-
hoods, their living conditions will improve. The result will be
neighborhoods that are more stable and communities whose members
will be better positioned to participate in mainstream society.
C. OTHER PROVISIONS
In some instances, the proposed rent control plan should include a
number of provisions that have been effectively employed by other rent
tion rather than by personal failings. This culture of segregation attaches value and meaning to
a way of life that the broader society would label as deviant and unworthy.") Although Massey
and Denton describe this phenomenon through the lens of racially segregative practices, the
principle is based on geographic isolation and class segregation. Id. While the phenomenon is
certainly correlated with racial segregation, it is not limited to it. Schill & Wachter, supra note
16, at 1289.
174 WILSON, supra note 10, at 20-62.
175 Id. at 57.
176 Under the proposed plan, liberal and conservative interests converge. For liberals, the
poor are better able to develop attitudes and expectations that will allow them to participate in
mainstream society. For conservatives, the poor become less reliant on public support and
better able to provide for themselves.
177 See Marcuse, supra note 127.
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control ordinances. The rent ceiling applied to absentee landlords should
allow workable, yearly rent adjustments, in case an absentee landlord
chooses to retain ownership of her property. This allowance will help
avoid the legal challenges to rent control ordinances encountered by
other localities. 178 Also, all large housing developments, including pub-
lic and federally subsidized housing units, should be excluded.1 79 Exclu-
sion prevents the owners of these buildings from suffering a
disproportionate impact, given their large number of units, and quells the
chilling effect rent control may have on the construction of new, large
housing developments.
Local legislatures should also consider adopting condominium con-
version laws that restrict owners' abilities to take an apartment off the
rental market by converting it into a condominium. On the one hand,
condominium conversions may reduce the supply of available rental
units but on the other hand, they may attract higher-income homeowners
(condo owners). Each locality should assess whether this provision and
its anticipated consequences would help further its goals.
Some localities may wish to exclude all new construction of resi-
dential units. The biggest criticism and accordingly, the biggest draw-
back to traditional rent control, is that it limits the supply of residential
units produced by the market. Since traditional rent control laws make
the rental market less profitable, they deter the construction of new
units.180 Moreover, since traditional rent control ordinances are usually
178 See Birkenfield v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001 (1976); see also Barton, supra note
88, at 92 (explaining the legal challenges that delayed the implementation of rent control in
Berkeley, California.).
179 See, e.g., COLLEGE PARK, MAR., CODE § 127-3, (excluding all "Apartment Buildings,"
defined as: "A building containing three or more dwelling units, each of which contain one or
more rooms suitable for occupancy as a residence and that contain a kitchen and bathroom
facilities. It does not include a single-family residence, or a duplex, triplex or quadraplex or
fraternity or sorority house.").
180 This happens to be one of the strongest criticisms against rent control. See DowNs,
supra note 1, at 45-52; Epstein, supra note 1, at 767; Timothy P. Terrell, Edited Transcript of
Proceedings of the Liberty Fund Inc. Seminar on the Common Law History of Landlord-Ten-
ant Law, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 623, 677 ("From an empirical point of view, the one bit of
evidence that I have seen, which is very compelling, is a series of building permits issued in
Washington, D. C., right before and after rent control-something like three to four thousand
down to one or two hundred."). However, many authors have concluded that empirical evi-
dence shows very little support for the huge deterrence of new construction by rent control.
See, e.g., Note, Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic Impact in a Gentrifying Housing Mar-
ket, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1835, 1844-45 (1988) [hereinafter Reassessing Rent Control]; W.
Dennis Keating, Commentary on Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 1223, 1229 (1989); Kenneth K. Baar, Would the Abolition of Rent Controls
Restore a Free Market?, 54 BROOK. L. Rav. 1231, 1232 (1989); Guy McPherson, It's the End
of the World as We Know It (And I Feel Fine): Rent Regulation in New York City and the
Unanswered Questions of Market and Society, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1160-61 (2004).
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adopted to address a shortage of affordable housing, 18' a policy that de-
ters construction will only exacerbate the existing shortage. If the local-
ity believes that applying rent control to newly constructed homes will
deter construction, it should consider a provision that excludes all new
construction of residential units.
Another potential provision enforces the implied warranty of habita-
bility, or the minimum housing code. 182 If a locality wants to aggres-
sively ensure that each home within the rent control zone will comply
with minimum housing quality standards, it may attribute code enforce-
ment priority to these homes. Since homes in these neighborhoods
would tend to be of the lowest quality, many apartments might not meet
the minimum housing code standards. 183 Including an enforcement pro-
vision allows potential purchasers to capitalize the expected maintenance
expense into the value paid for the home. 184
If the proposed rent control plan is successful in reintroducing a
middle- and working-class homeowner presence to blighted neighbor-
hoods, thereby deconcentrating the poor, it can be applied to new neigh-
borhoods as pockets of poverty develop within them. Potentially, the
poorest residents will be displaced by the proposed rent control scheme
and will seek apartments in other nearby low-income neighborhoods. 185
As local policymakers notice a neighborhood either "filtering up" or ex-
periencing a "downward tailspin," either as a result of or independent of
the rent control plan in another neighborhood, rent control should be ap-
plied to this new neighborhood as well. The proposed plan's goal is to
eradicate concentrations of poverty wherever they occur.
The problems of poverty may not be solved by the proposed rent
control scheme, but they will certainly be alleviated. If rent control is
applied to pockets of poverty as they develop, over time, the poor will be
181 See, e.g., Los ANGELES, CAL., RENT STABLILIZATION ORDINANCE, ch. 15, art. 1,
§ 151.01 ("There is a shortage of decent, safe and sanitary housing in the City of Los Angeles
resulting in a critically low vacancy factor.").
182 See Reassessing Rent Control, supra note 180 (arguing that landlords in gentrifying
markets can be deterred from under-maintaining units by enforcement of the warranty of habit-
ability, within a regulatory scheme that also uses eviction restrictions, residential zoning re-
strictions, and a moratorium on condominium conversion).
183 Kennedy, supra note 92, at 490 (arguing that in a declining neighborhood, a rational
landlord may choose to "reduce maintenance below the level necessary to keep a building in
existence as a residential unit").
184 Localities should consider the effect this proposal would have on their ability to attract
resident landlords. If it would significantly discourage people from purchasing such homes,
the provision should obviously not be implanted.
185 See Hirsch, supra note 28, at 92. ("The evidence is overwhelming that people conduct
their housing searches in limited areas; that they are most aware of the housing available near
their current residences; and that their existing location is the single most critical factor in
determining their new location-and each of these findings is more true for low-income
households, renters and minorities than others.").
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dispersed throughout well-maintained neighborhoods with middle-in-
come homeowners, rather than packed into crumbling neighborhoods of
predominantly poor tenants and absentee landlords. Dispersal of the
poor throughout society will produce collective socialization, will better
integrate the poor into the fabric of mainstream American life, and will
reduce the social costs created by concentration effects. 186
III. POTENTIAL BARRIERS AND ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES
There are a number of serious questions and potential barriers that
the proposed rent control scheme must overcome. In this section, I con-
front criticisms particular to the proposed rent control scheme as well as
the classic criticisms leveled at traditional rent control.
A. ECONOMIC CRITIQUES AND BARRIERS
1. Deterred New Construction and Decreased Supply of Rental
Housing
The biggest criticism to traditional rent control schemes has been
that over the long term, they actually hurt the people they are intended to
help.187 They do this by creating disincentives for people to invest in the
construction of new housing units. To address this concern, previously-
enacted rent control schemes have generally exempted newly constructed
rental units and at least one has excluded substantially rehabilitated
units.188 Arguably, these exemptions are justified because an ordinance
that renders investment in housing construction less profitable deters in-
vestors from financing the construction of new housing units. 189 Further,
since traditional rent control schemes are usually adopted to address a
shortage of affordable housing, 190 a policy that reduces the rate of new
construction will only exacerbate the existing shortage.
Although I suggest that all newly constructed units be excluded
from rent control, upon a closer examination, whether one includes or
excludes such units may not make a significant difference in the long
term. The primary impact of the proposed rent control scheme is to
cause a shift in ownership from absentee to resident landlords. No
change in the quantity of housing units would necessarily occur as a re-
sult of this change. Although it is reasonable to predict that the value of
186 See generally WILSON, supra note 10.
187 See supra note 1.
188 BERKLEY, CAL., BERKELEY MUNICIPAL CODE, RENT STABILIZATION AND EVICTION
FOR GOOD CAUSE ORDINANCE § 13.76.050(l) (2007); EAST PALO ALTO, CAL., RENT STABILI-
ZATION ORDINANCE 076, § (5)(E) (1988); OAKLAND, CAL., NEW CONSTRUCTION ORDINANCE
No. 12538, §§ 8.22.030(A)(5)-(6) (2007).
189 See supra note 1.
190 See, e.g., supra note 155.
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homes will decrease slightly, it is unlikely that the proposed plan will
have a noticeable effect on the production of new units. 191
Since rent control limits sales of the relevant rental property to only
prospective resident landlords, demand for these homes may decrease as
a result of the smaller pool of potential purchasers and their lower antici-
pated purchasing power. If this were the only effect, it would cause the
value of homes, both new and old, to decrease and would thereby deter
new construction. However, the decreased demand from absentee land-
lords will be offset by the increased demand by resident landlords. If
raising the resident landlord rate, and therefore the middle-income home-
owner presence in a neighborhood, will have positive effects on the com-
munity, the number of people willing to live in the neighborhood will
increase as well. The increased demand from prospective resident land-
lords will mitigate or offset the decreased demand from prospective ab-
sentee landlords. There is little or no decrease in the value of homes and
consequently, little or no deterrence of the construction of new units.
Furthermore, since rent control should only be adopted in the most
blighted neighborhoods, it is unlikely construction will be deterred be-
cause there is very little private construction in these neighborhoods to
begin with.192 Without costly government subsidies, it is not cost-effec-
tive to construct housing for the poor. 193 Therefore, very little, if any,
new construction in blighted neighborhoods would be deterred. Rather,
over the long term, improved maintenance and a better outlook for the
neighborhood, brought about by a greater middle- and working-class
homeowner presence, will increase demand for new construction in these
neighborhoods.
Under traditional rent control, neighboring communities must also
be considered as these communities affect housing production in areas
not yet subject to rent control. If developers fear that rent control will be
extended to other neighborhoods, it may have a chilling effect on hous-
191 Keating, Commentary on Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
Brook. L. Rev. 1223, 1229 (citing "[e]mpirical evidence indicat[ing] that the level of new
construction does not necessarily vary between similar rent controlled and non-rent controlled
jurisdictions"); Kenneth K. Baar, Would the Abolition of Rent Control Restore a Free Market?,
54 Brook. L. Rev. 1231, 1232-34 (1989) ("The reports of the past few decades that have
included data on new apartment construction in rent controlled jurisdictions have been mixed
in their conclusions. A significant number, if not a majority of them, have reached the conclu-
sion that rent controls have not had a significant negative impact on apartment construction.").
192 Smith, supra note 125; see also HOUSING CRISIS TASK FORCE, Los ANGELES CITY
COUNCIL REPORT OF THE HOUSING CRISIS TASK FORCE 14 (2000), available at http://housing-
crisisla.ucla.edu/Recommendations/Findings.pdf ("[L]and and building costs are so expensive
that market-rate developers can't construct new rental housing with rents under $1,000 per
month.").
193 Reassessing Rent Control, supra note 180, at 1836; Phillip Weitzman, Economics and
Rent Regulation: A Call for a New Perspective, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 975, 981
(1984-1985).
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ing construction in those neighborhoods. 194 However, this fear should
not have an appreciable effect under the proposed scheme for the same
reasons offered above. Namely, since the proposed rent control plan
targets only blighted neighborhoods, little, if any, new construction will
be deterred. In fact, the proposed plan may even increase demand for
new construction.
2. Inefficiencies Caused By Over- and Under-Consumption of
Housing
Another criticism of traditional rent control is that it is inefficient
because it encourages tenants to both over- and under-consume hous-
ing. 195 Tenants in traditional rent controlled apartments are said to over-
consume housing in that they occupy apartments beyond their means. 196
Traditional rent control reduces rent levels to the point where tenants live
in apartments whose demand, and therefore price, is higher than the ten-
ant could bear under market conditions. The rent ceiling allows tenants
to live in apartments whose quality is beyond their means and leads to a
reduced supply of housing. For instance, if rent control allows a single
tenant to live in an apartment that's size exceeds what she could afford
under market conditions, she may be occupying an apartment that would
otherwise be occupied by a family. This inefficiency prevents the apart-
ment from being possessed by the tenant who values it most 197 and there-
fore leads to an inefficient allocation of housing resources and
ultimately, to a decrease in the housing supply.
On the other hand, rent control is said to also encourage tenants to
under-consume housing. 198 As a rent control tenant's income rises, she
is deterred from moving to a higher quality apartment commensurate
with her purchasing power. Since the marginal increase in housing qual-
194 Epstein, supra note 1, at 767 ("Even if new construction is exempt from the statute,
existing rent control laws give a loud and clear signal that old policies may be reversed so that
future units may be subject to similar restrictions. That prospect is, moreover, far from negli-
gible because once those units are occupied, their residents add a new class of voters to the
rolls whose interests can no longer be ignored in the political calculus. All rent control statutes
thus depress the future total return of any investment. Reduced returns mean reduced invest-
ments, so that rent control statutes only exacerbate the housing shortages they are said to
alleviate.").
195 Edward L. Glaeser & Erzo F. P. Luttmer, The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent
Control, 93 AM. EcON. Rav. 1027, 1030, 1044 (1999) ("[Wle find that approximately 20
percent of apartments [in a rent control area in New York City] are in the wrong hands under
the conservative assumption of efficient sorting on unobservable characteristics within demo-
graphic subgroups"); see also David P. Sims, Out of Control: What Can We Learn from the
End of Massachusetts Rent Control?, 61 J. URa. EcoN. 129, 150 (2007); D. Benjamin Barros,
Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 287 (2006).
196 See generally Glaeser & Luttmer, supra note 195.
197 Measured by a person's willingness and ability to pay.
198 Sims, supra note 195, at 150; Barros, supra note 195, 287.
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ity will be less than the marginal increase in rent expense, the tenant will
opt to remain in the lower quality, rent-controlled apartment. Traditional
rent control encourages residents of controlled units to remain in their
apartments longer than they otherwise would in order to reap the benefits
of lower rents.' 99 This causes a decrease in the supply of available apart-
ments because tenants are less likely to move.
These legitimate criticisms function differently under the proposed
rent control scheme and do not present a significant problem. Since rent
for tenants in resident landlord property will not be significantly lower
than the market rent, the incentive to over- and under-consume will be
slight. Additionally, many housing scholars have questioned the extent
to which rents for low-income tenants are the product of free market
economics or the product of restrictive land-use controls. 200
To the extent that restrictive land-use controls (i.e., zoning ordi-
nances) limit the production of housing units, rent control corrects the
fair market value of rents rather than distorts them. If a zoning ordinance
prevents the construction of additional housing units, the housing supply
will be lower than it would otherwise be without government regulation.
Basic economics dictates that the diminished housing supply will in-
crease the cost of housing, including rent.20 1 This unearned "economic
rent" that accrues to landlords forms the basis and justification for rent
control. 202
Rent control can correct the imperfections of the housing market.
Just as the federal minimum wage is viewed as a control to militate
against market imperfections caused by efforts to avoid starvation, 20 3 so
too can rent ceilings militate against the market imperfections caused by
the drive to avoid homelessness. The severity of becoming homeless,
much like starving, allows landlords to exploit their control over this
primary, physiological need, and to extract economic rents from te-
199 Ellickson, supra note 1, at 948.
200 Reassessing Rent Control, supra note 180, at 1850 ("Wealthy suburbs have avoided
internalizing the adverse costs associated with development and poorer inhabitants by exclud-
ing lower-income families through single-family housing, and large-lot and minimum floor
requirements. Government-created distortions such as these make it unlikely that existing
housing prices efficiently allocate housing resources.").
201 Barton, supra note 88, at 89 ("The forces that increase land values are generally joined
by restrictive land-use controls that limit additional housing supply.").
202 See Skaburskis & Teitz, supra note 149, at 47-56.
203 Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights
Management", 97 MIcH. L. RaV. 462, 513 (1998) ("Where the harsher consequences of com-
modification are unacceptable, society attempts to introduce stabilizing measures-for exam-
ple, minimum wage laws and/or welfare grants to mitigate the starvation that serves as
incentive to labor; rent control laws to lessen the impact of the laws of supply and demand on
the housing market").
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nants.204 The increase in rent levels causes people to under-consume
because they cannot afford housing of sufficient quality. It also causes
people to over-consume as people spend a higher percentage of their in-
come on housing than they would in a perfect market.205 Viewed in this
light, inefficiencies caused by the over- and under-consumption of hous-
ing are not created by rent control, but rather, are diminished by it.
Regardless of whether optimal efficiency is achieved in the rental
housing market, most commentators have failed to consider the externali-
ties caused by existing market conditions. 206 By eliminating the condi-
tions under which costly "concentration effects" take hold, namely high
poverty rates and the absence of resident landlords, rent control may pro-
duce a result that is more efficient than the present state. In other words,
even if rent control sets rent ceilings at an "inefficient" level, society's
long-term savings, measured by its prevention of "concentration effects"
and reductions in subsidies to the poor, may decrease aggregate social
costs.
3. Under-Maintenance of Rental Units
Under traditional rent control, landlords who own rental property
when the ordinance takes effect must choose to either continue operating
their properties in the same way they did before or to reduce maintenance
to offset their revenue losses.20 7 Economists argue that landlords will
choose to under-maintain their units because whatever short-term gains
the tenants receive from reduced rents will be offset by long-term losses
caused by the reduction in the quality of housing. 20 8
This argument however, has not gone unchallenged. At least one
commentator argues that maintenance outlays are only a small part of a
landlord's business plans as they "form only a minor part of the land-
204 See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d
713, 727 (N.J. 1975) ("There cannot be the slightest doubt that shelter, along with food, are the
most basic human needs.").
205 Edgar 0. Olsen, Is Rent Control Good Social Policy?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 931,
940-44 (1991).
206 Arnott, supra note 1, at 418, discusses the "theory of the second best." Arnott argues
that efficiency analysis is incomplete if one does not consider that impact that a given policy
will have on a separate or sub market. Id. For instance, if a policy produces less than optimal
returns in the housing market but significantly reduces public subsidies, it may be the case
that, on balance, the policy enhances efficiency. Commentators on rent control have fre-
quently overlooked this point.
207 C. Peter Rydell & Kevin Neels, Direct Effects of Undermaintenance and Deteriora-
tion, in THE RENT CONTROL DEBATE 91-92 (Paul L. Niebanck, ed. 1985) (discussing the
impact of rent control on maintenance expenditures).
208 Id. ("Reacting to revenue reductions by reducing maintenance expenditures, their be-
havior would gradually eliminate the initial price reduction benefits. Insofar as this behavior
holds, rent control may be found to have transferred the social benefits associated with housing
to some households in the short run, at the expense of other households in the long run.").
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lord's outlays, far less than mortgage interest payments, insurance pay-
ments, and, in some jurisdictions, water charges and property taxes. 209
Another commentator states that:
The greater part of the category of physical deterioration
seems to consist of those minor incidents of wear and
tear and of the elements which, summed together, form a
fairly regular and substantial component of annual hous-
ing costs: flaking paint, broken windows, cracked or
warped siding, leaky roofs, clogged plumbing or drains,
worn-out screens, scuffed floors or linoleum, etc. The
point is that with adequate maintenance the house need
not depreciate in these respects. 210
Even under traditional rent control it is not clear if decreased rents
will lead to a substantially reduced quality of housing.
Under the proposed rent control plan, however, the under-mainte-
nance of the housing stock is a non-issue. Under-maintenance becomes a
concern in traditional rent control schemes because homeowners are pre-
vented from recouping their repairs and maintenance expenditures by in-
creasing rents. However, assuming that absentee landlords are induced
to sell their homes, under the proposed plan, the purchasing resident
landlords are fully aware of the restrictions rent control places on them.
As stated, the reduced expected rental income will be capitalized into the
price paid for the home, and will not impact the homeowner's expected
profit. Whatever maintenance expenditures the homeowner expects are
factored into the price paid for the home. Therefore, the application of
rent control will not affect the amount of funds available for repairs and
maintenance.
In fact, the proposed rent control scheme may increase the mainte-
nance of the rental units. Studies have shown that even when controlling
for a number of socio-economic factors, "resident landlords maintain
their properties at higher levels than absentee landlords."'211 In a conclu-
sion that not only substantiates the notion of greater maintenance by resi-
dent landlords but also supports the core of this paper's thesis, Galster
explains that "expanding the number of homeowners appears to be the
single most potent means for encouraging the upkeep of dwellings in a
neighborhood... [aInd the differences are even more dramatic when con-
sidering low-income occupants. '212 Therefore, rather than reduce main-
209 Skaburskis & Teitz, supra note 149, at 46.
210 Ira S. Lowry, Filtering and Housing Standards: A Conceptual Analysis, 36 LAND
EcON. 362, 365 (1960).
211 Rohe & Stewart, supra note 70, at 297.
212 GALSTER, supra note 79, at 296.
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tenance, the proposed rent control scheme encourages resident landlords
to maintain their homes.
B. POLITICAL CRITIQUES AND BARRIERS
1. More Effective Alternatives
It may be alleged that the proposed rent control scheme is unneces-
sary because prospective resident landlords can be granted a financial
advantage via tax deductions. This argument posits that tax deductions
are preferable because the cost of the proposed plan is borne by all tax
payers, rather than the absentee landlords. Further, it may be argued that
tax deductions are more desirable because the implementation of rent
control laws and the informal markets they produce present substantial
concern.
213
However, rent controls maintain at least two significant advantages
over tax deductions. First, tax deductions diminish the in-moving home-
owner's equity by increasing the purchase price. Whereas the proposed
rent control plan will lower absentee landlords' demand and allow pro-
spective resident landlords to purchase the home at a lower price, 214 tax
deductions will do the opposite. Tax deductions would increase resident
landlords' demand and thus increase the home's sale price. This allows
sellers to realize a larger profit from the sale and consequently, strips
more of the equity from the home. This is a precarious position for in-
moving homeowners because the lack of equity exposes them to height-
ened risk by diminishing the "safety net" that equity provides. 215 Moreo-
ver, if resident landlords have a larger mortgage to pay, the higher
payments will likely be recouped through increased rents, decreased
maintenance, or both,216 a result that is unfavorable for homeowners, te-
nants, and the community.
Second, tax deductions would effectively provide a public subsidy
to prospective resident landlords, the cost of which would be borne by
the locality via lower tax revenue. If tax deductions are extended to a
significant number of homes, the subsequent cost to the public would
assumedly be fairly substantial. It seems highly unlikely that any locality
would be able to absorb the lower tax revenue, making tax deductions
less politically feasible. Alternatively, rent control places the burden of
213 See Epstein, supra note 1, at 741 (recounting his personal experience with a building
superintendent who "needed to have his palm smeared").
214 See supra Figure 2.
215 Equity in a home is equivalent to a savings account or a "safety net." If a major
expense arises, whether or not associated with the home, equity gives homeowners access to
capital through a second mortgage. This may determine whether a homeowner survives a
financial storm or loses her home to foreclosure.
216 Rolf Goetze et al., Stabilizing Neighborhoods, reprinted in HOUSING IN AMERICA, 188
(Roger Montgomery & Daniel R. Mandelker eds., 2d ed. 1979).
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the subsidy on absentee landlords, the parties substantially responsible
for the neighborhood's downward trajectory. 217 Because of the addi-
tional equity for in-moving homebuyers and the imposition of the cost to
the responsible parties, I believe that rent control is considerably more
appealing and equitable.
Further, while I do not dispute that traditional rent control laws raise
significant concerns regarding implementation and the informal market, I
seriously question the magnitude of these concerns under the proposed
scheme. Since I do not suggest that the proposed plan be implemented
on a city- or town-wide level, the number of regulated homes will be
markedly reduced, making it much easier for the locality to regulate the
rent-controlled homes. More importantly, if rent control accomplishes
its goal, there will be little need for regulation and oversight. If absentee
landlords sell their homes to resident landlords, most of these concerns
will disappear because resident landlords will not be subject to the strict
rent ceilings.218 The locality can focus its regulatory efforts on the lim-
ited number of absentee landlords who remain in the rent control zone.
Finally, the significant price reductions in traditional rent control
laws induce landlords and tenants to engage in illegal agreements
whereby the tenant pays a "key money" or "side payment" to the land-
lord in exchange for living in the rent controlled unit.219 If the proposed
plan is successful, then few absentee landlords would remain to engage
in these illegal practices. Alternately, if absentee landlords do remain,
these practices can be effectively regulated if localities police the absen-
tee landlord-owned properties. 220 Thus, the implementation and infor-
mal market concerns present under traditional rent control are either
eliminated or greatly reduced under the proposed plan.
2. Government Bureaucracy and Corruption
The risk of government corruption seriously threatens the proposed
rent control scheme, particularly in the choice of neighborhoods to which
it will be applies. Since absentee landlords face the risk of having to sell
217 See supra Part IC.
218 If localities extend additional protections to existing tenants, resident landlords would
only be subject to the Year 1 base rent level discussed in Part 1I. These base rent levels are
specifically designed to slightly reduce rents. Since there is relatively little to gain for tenants
living in rent-controlled apartments, this will significantly diminish the incentives for landlords
and tenants to engage in "key money" or "side payment" transactions.
219 See Arnott, supra note 1.
220 Perhaps the most effective way to prevent these illegal "key money" payments would
be to amend the local landlord-tenant law. If landlords are prevented from evicting tenants for
non-payment of rent if it can be shown that they have accepted an illegal side payment, the
practice can be adequately controlled. Tenants would learn very quickly that they can with-
hold rent and not be evicted. I believe this would effectively deter landlords from accepting
"key money" payments.
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their investments, there will likely be a strong lobbying campaign on
behalf of absentee landlords to prevent rent control from applying to
their homes. 221 This lobbying effort will come in two forms. First, ab-
sentee landlords, as a group, will lobby against rent control being en-
acted, and then against it being applied to certain neighborhoods.
Second, if rent control is applied to neighborhoods in which their proper-
ties lie, individual absentee landlords will urge the locality to draw the
boundaries of the rent-controlled neighborhood to exclude those proper-
ties that they own.
To prevent this political hazard, each locality should articulate clear
guidelines for the kind of neighborhood to which rent control should be
applied. Many cities already do this by designating areas as revitaliza-
tion zones, tax incremental financing zones, and blighted zones. 222 By
setting clear standards, advocates can ensure that the neediest neighbor-
hoods will not be bypassed.
Even after a locality decides to apply rent control to a particular
neighborhood, another contentious debate will ensue regarding where to
draw the boundaries of the rent control zone. It will be impossible to act
with utmost fairness to each homeowner because the process of line-
drawing necessarily leads to two homes sitting next to each other, one
subject to rent control and the other not. Further compounding this diffi-
culty is the fact that often, a neighborhood will span beyond a local polit-
ical boundary. Even if it makes sense to apply rent control to the entire
neighborhood, a local legislator may vote against the zone reaching her
political district. Therefore, it is important that independent, non-politi-
cal actors draw these lines. Whether rent control reaches the right homes
will depend on the extent to which this process is depoliticized.
3. Government's Woeful Track Record
Critics of the proposed plan may also cite the government's woeful
track record of intervening in the housing market. In fact, many com-
mentators blame the federal and local governments for the growth and
expansion of highly concentrated poverty neighborhoods. 223 Addition-
ally, traditional rent control has often been characterized as a government
221 Undoubtedly, a strong public campaign against rent control would occur in any
neighborhood.
222 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1471(2) (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 33030 (Deering 2006); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-25-103(2) (West 2006); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 41, §14-803 (2006); MINN. STAT. § 469.002 (2005); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1728.01 (LexisNexis 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-31-8 (2006).
223 See generally Schill & Wachter, supra note 16 (arguing that federal public housing
policy has greatly contributed to concentrated urban poverty); CASHIN, supra note 25 (arguing
that zoning ordinances, the federal mortgage insurance program, urban renewal programs, and
a host of private biases contributed to the creation of urban ghettos).
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intervention that produced destructive unintended consequences. 224
These commentators argue that the market is the best way to allocate
scarce resources and that government intervention merely distorts the
market's efficient operation.
However, there is no such thing as a free market in housing. Zoning
laws, mortgage rate subsidies, housing subsidies, minimum housing
codes, and an uncountable number of other laws, policies, and tax deduc-
tions significantly burden the free operation of the housing market. Un-
less one eradicates all forms of housing regulations, the proposed rent
control scheme can play an important role alongside the regulations that
now exist.
Although I readily concede my suspicions of government's ability
to produce efficient results, I believe that local governments are very
competent to regulate the housing market by enacting the proposed rent
control plan. The government, at all levels, is particularly adept at set-
ting the background rules by which everyone plays. In fact, I would
argue that this is the purpose of government. The proposed rent control
plan is intended to lay down the rules of engagement whereby private
parties' incentives align in the right direction. Unlike "Section 8" vouch-
ers or the public housing program, the proposed plan does not require the
government, with its attendant bureaucracies and inefficiencies, to be-
come a market participant. Rather, it proposes that government play the
role it is institutionally established to perform. Much like zoning ordi-
nances, after rent control is passed, government should have very little
involvement beyond policing activities. Thus, the proposed rent control
plan cannot be dismissed on simple "free market" grounds. Although
government does have a woeful track record in housing interventions,
this proposal only asks that it perform the foundational, yet limited, role
of setting the background rules.
4. Political Feasibility
Of course, for the proposed scheme to be effective, it must first be
enacted. In order to determine whether this rent control scheme is politi-
cally feasible, it is important to consider the effect it will have on the
interests of the most politically influential group in local politics: existing
homeowners. 225 William Fischel argues that homeowners' "concern for
home values is the central motivator of local government behavior. 226
224 See sources cited supra note 1.
225 William A. Fischell, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES 4 (Harvard Univ.
Press 2001) (stating that homeowners are the most "politically influential group within most
localities.").
226 Id. at 5.
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Therefore, the viability of rent control will depend on the impact it has
on the home values of a neighborhood's existing homeowners.
For the reasons discussed in Part IB above, homeowners should
readily welcome the entry of more homeowners. 227
C. LEGAL BARRIERS
In this section I examine the legality of the proposed rent control
scheme under the Substantive Due Process clause of the Constitution.
Understanding that a thorough constitutional analysis would require an
article of equal or greater length, I will make my analysis brief and
concise.
1. Substantive Due Process-Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that "pri-
vate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion. ''228 Of interest to this analysis is not whether the land is being put
to "public use," but rather, whether compensation should be paid to those
burdened by the plan.229 The Court has recognized broad principles im-
plicit in the Fifth Amendment's guarantee, but it has been unable to pro-
vide specific guidance as to what constitutes a taking, particularly where
the alleged taking results from a government regulation that merely
reduces the value of a person's property.230 Aside from three clear rules
which do not apply here,231 the Court has not crafted a clear doctrinal
approach for takings analysis.
The current takings doctrine was born in Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,232 which states that a
regulation will be considered a taking if it "goes too far.",233 Rather than
articulating a "set formula" for what constitutes a taking, the Court con-
siders "justice and fairness" to determine whether a taking has oc-
227 See supra Part 1B.
228 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
229 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (dealing solely with the ques-
tion of whether the City of New London's redevelopment plan served a "public purpose").
230 See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915).
231 Rent control does not fall into any one of the three clear rules adopted by the Supreme
Court. It does not "prohibit all economically beneficial use of land." Lucas v. S. C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). It does not impose upon a landowner a "permanent
physical occupation" by the government. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). Finally, it does not entail a government exaction. See Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835
(1987).
232 See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
233 Id. at 415.
62 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
curred. 234  In its consideration, the Court has identified three
"particularly significant" factors to determine whether a regulation vio-
lates the constitution: the economic impact of the regulation, the interfer-
ence with reasonable, investment-backed expectations, and the character
of the government action.235 Each of these factors is discussed in turn. 236
The proposed rent control plan will likely survive the economic im-
pact factor as the Court has stated that a "diminution in property
value,' 237 without more, is insufficient to sustain a takings action.238 In
fact, the Penn Central Court cites two cases, Euclid v. Ambler Realty2 39
and Hadacheck v. Sebastian,2 40 in which property owners suffered a 75%
and an 87.5% diminution in value, respectively, because of a local regu-
lation. In each of these cases, the Court held that no taking had
occurred. 24 1
The economic impact of the proposed rent control plan will cer-
tainly depend on the steepness of the rent ceiling applied to absentee
landlords, the lower the rent ceiling, the greater the economic impact.
While absentee landlords will surely experience a "diminution" in their
property values, it is very doubtful that it will be close to the reductions
experienced by the property owners in Euclid or Hadacheck. Although
the homes will be worth less to an absentee landlord who manages the
properties under rent control, they will retain a high value to prospective
resident landlords who can charge higher rents. As such, absentee land-
234 See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295
(1981) ("[T]his Court has generally 'been unable to develop any "set formula" for determining
when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public action be compen-
sated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few per-
sons.' Rather, [this court] has examined the 'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors-such as the economic impact of the
regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character
of the government action-that have particular significance." (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979))).
235 Id.; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25
(1978).
236 Notably, property owners, or their agents, have the burden of proof in establishing that
a taking has occurred. Since the proposed rent control scheme is expected to have only a slight
short-term impact on property values, it will be difficult, and probably impossible, to argue
that the law is unconstitutional on its face. For the complainants to meet their burden, they
must provide evidence of an actual, if not substantial, decrease in property value.
237 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131.
238 See Max Gibbons, Of Windfalls and Property Rights: Palazzolo and the Regulatory
Takings Debate, 50 UCLA L. Rav. 1259, 1266 (2003) ("[T]he Penn Central Court quickly
noted that 'diminution in property value' by a regulation 'reasonably related to the promotion
of the general welfare' does not, by itself, constitute a taking.").
239 Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (analyzing zoning ordinance that pro-
hibited land being put to industrial use).
240 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (analyzing law that prohibited the opera-
tion of a brickyard in residential neighborhoods).
241 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131.
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lords will be able to sell their investment properties to prospective resi-
dent landlords for an amount close to the pre-rent control fair market
value. It is extremely unlikely therefore, that the economic impact will
approach that seen in Euclid and Hadacheck.
In conjunction with the "economic impact" prong of the Penn Cen-
tral test, courts examine "the extent to which the regulation. . . inter-
fere[s] with distinct investment-backed expectations." 242 This factor has
"become an increasingly important issue in regulatory takings jurispru-
dence, while [economic impact and the character of the government ac-
tion] are now of questionable relevance. ' 24 3 Therefore, determining
whether the proposed rent control scheme interferes with distinct (rea-
sonable) investment-backed expectations is crucial to determining a reg-
ulation's constitutionality.
Absentee owners would seem to have a strong argument that their
investment-backed expectations have been seriously frustrated. In fact,
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Penn Central proclaims
that "[t]he Court has frequently held that... the inability of the owner to
make a reasonable return on his property requires compensation under
the Fifth Amendment."'24 Once rent control takes effect, absentee land-
lords would argue, the rent ceiling will undoubtedly affect their ability to
earn a reasonable return on their investment and would thus constitute a
taking.
However, the "reasonable return" test suffers from numerous con-
ceptual problems. As Justice Rehnquist notes, a court must first define
what a reasonable return for various types of property would be, and then
it must define the particular property unit at issue. 245 In other words, a
court must determine the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
It must define a mandatory minimum return (the numerator) as well as
the basis for determining the reasonable return rate (the denominator).
In deciding the denominator, a court must decide what constitutes
the underlying value of the disputed land. 246 Under the proposed rent
control scheme, would the court use the value of the home at the time
rent control went into effect, or would it use another value? Perhaps the
original purchase price would be more appropriate? Similarly, the nu-
merator issue would have to be resolved. What is a reasonable rate of
return for absentee landlords, and what level of monthly rent would al-
low it to be realized? How does one account for the heterogeneous na-
ture of the housing stock or of the different skill levels of landlords?
242 Id. at 124.
243 Gibbons, supra note 238, at 1270.
244 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 149 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
245 Id. at 149 n.13.
246 Epstein, supra note 1, at 751.
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Without providing clear answers to these questions, this test is especially
troublesome because it would require an individualized assessment of the
ordinance's constitutionality for each and every absentee landlord. As a
result of these conceptual problems, the Court has conceded that the rea-
sonable rate of return standard has proven unworkable and cannot form
the basis of a takings claim.247
Even assuming, arguendo, that the proposed rent control plan would
deny absentee landlords a reasonable rate of return if they remained in
the landlord business, the constitutional analysis would not be over.
Since the homes would nonetheless retain a high value for prospective
resident landlords, absentee landlords would be able to sell their homes,
and in many cases, earn a reasonable return on their investment. No case
or statute has ever declared being an absentee landlord as a protected
right. So long as the home can be sold to an in-moving resident landlord,
the rent control plan should not make absentee landlords suffer severe
losses. Therefore, the plan does not offend absentee landlords' invest-
ment backed expectations.
With respect to the "character of the government action" prong, the
Court explains that "[a] 'taking' may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government, then when interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the com-
mon good."248 Although the importance of this factor has been ques-
tioned,249 the Court has established a per se rule that a forced, permanent
physical invasion constitutes a taking.250 No such physical invasion is
compelled by the proposed rent control scheme however, and thus the
per se rule will not apply.
With regard to this last prong, the proposed rent control plan is very
similar to the regulation upheld in Penn Central, wherein the three-factor
balancing test was born. 251 When New York City decided to enact its
landmark preservation law, it did so believing that it would "enhance the
quality of life" for all of its residents.2 52 Accordingly, the city chose to
247 See id.; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 n.7 (1992)
("[The] uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in our 'deprivation' fraction
has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court.").
248 Penn. Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted).
249 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-29; Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d
1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("The effect ... of Lucas was to dramatically change the third
criterion [of the Penn Central balancing test], from one in which courts ... were called upon
to make ad hoc balancing decisions, balancing private property rights against state regulatory
policy, to one in which state property law, incorporating common law nuisance doctrine,
controls.").
250 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
251 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124-35.
252 Id. at 108.
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burden the owners of landmark properties in order to foster civic pride,
protect and enhance the city's attraction for tourists and visitors, support
and stimulate business and industry, strengthen the economy, and pro-
mote the use of historic landmarks for the education, pleasure and wel-
fare of residents.2 53 After having two building plans rejected by the city,
the owners of Penn Central Terminal sued to invalidate the historic pres-
ervation law on the grounds that it constituted a taking.25 4 The Court
rejected the owner's argument, referencing a clause in the ordinance that
allowed an owner to sell his building rights to adjacent parcels. 255 Under
this provision, the Court reasoned, an owner would be able to recover
some of the value he claimed to have lost as a result of the ordinance. 256
The purposes of the New York City ordinance in Penn Central are
highly comparable to the expected results of rent control, such as foster-
ing a healthier living environment, providing more stable communities,
enhancing the city's tax base, supporting and stimulating investment,
strengthening the local economy, and improving the welfare of the re-
sidents. Similarly, the proposed rent control plan burdens absentee land-
lords with the cost of improving blighted neighborhoods but allows them
to offset some of the lost value of their properties by selling their homes
to prospective resident landlords. Similar to the plaintiffs in Penn Cen-
tral, this prong would not aid absentee landlords in their attempts to in-
validate the proposed rent control plan.
Ultimately, the takings analysis is reduced to a fairness test. The
three factors considered above should be analyzed in the aggregate to
determine whether "justice and fairness" require that the economic inju-
ries be compensated by the government. 257 It should be stressed that the
only aspect of this proposal that raises legitimate constitutional concerns
is that which applies to absentee landlords.258 However, their properties
are held as pure investments, similar to stocks, bonds, and commodities.
Cries of unfairness, therefore, must be considered in the context of other
investment opportunities and the role of government regulation in those
areas.
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the majority
stated that "[t]his Court has consistently affirmed that States have broad
power to regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant
relationship in particular without paying compensation for all economic
253 Id. at 109.
254 Id. at 116-19.
255 Id. at 128-37.
256 Id. at 136-37.
257 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981)
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
258 Resident landlords will presumably purchase the property subject to and fully on no-
tice of any restrictions.
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injuries that such regulation entails." 259 The Court went on, in Pennell v.
City of San Jose, to "recognize[e] that government may intervene in the
marketplace to regulate rates or prices that are artificially inflated as a
result of a monopoly or near monopoly or a discrepancy between supply
and demand in the market for a certain product. '260 The Pennell Court
faced a rent control ordinance that had a potentially greater impact on the
value of homeowners' properties than the current plan, yet the Court ex-
plicitly refused to reconsider the constitutionality of rent control. 261
The proposed rent control scheme will not perpetrate injustice upon
absentee landlords. Their investments in rental property, like all invest-
ments, are accompanied by the inherent risk of adverse government regu-
lation. As Bruce Ackerman states, "There can be little doubt that our
economic organization is no longer permeated with a bias towards laissez
faire in general; nor is there a particular prejudice against affirmative
governmental action in matters relating to land use control-if anything,
interventionism is even more common here than elsewhere. ' 262 The pro-
posed rent control scheme is no different than a zoning ordinance (in
fact, I argue that it is a zoning ordinance) that regulates the manner in
which a property owner uses her property. The scheme merely "adjust[s]
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good"
and thus, under current takings jurisprudence, should not be deemed
unconstitutional. 263
CONCLUSION
In 1980, Derrick Bell argued that the gains made by blacks during
the civil rights movement came when their interests (temporarily) con-
259 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982).
260 Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 US. 1, 11-12 (1988) (citations omitted).
261 Id. at 12 n.6.
262 Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Hous-
ing Codes, Housing Subsidies, and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1163
(1971).
263 I added the caveat of "under current takings jurisprudence" to call attention to the fact
that takings law may change given the changing composition of the Court's justices. The
Supreme Court justices have each shown a consistent disposition to uphold or strike down
local government regulations that affect economic interests. In the important takings cases of
Nollan, Lucas, Dolan, and Kelo, Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Thomas and O'Connor voted to
strike down the local statute in 15 out of 15 possible votes. Similarly, for the same cases,
Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg voted to uphold the local statute in 9 out of 9
possible votes. The only "wild card" in these cases was Justice Kennedy who voted to strike
down the statute in Lucas and Dolan but voted to uphold the statute in Kelo.
This level of consistency among the court's conservative and liberal justices suggests a
political predisposition to uphold or strike down local government actions that burden property
interests. As the composition of the court changes, it is possible that takings jurisprudence will
tend towards the political disposition of the faction with the majority of justices.
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verged with those of white mainstream society.264 Bell's thesis can be
generalized to conclude that any minority group-be it a political, eco-
nomic, racial, or other minority-is more likely to make tangible gains
when their interests converge with those of the political and economic
elites. Citations to the principle of "interest convergence" are legion and
the concept has so much explanatory force that it is almost axiomatic. I
ask rhetorically: Why would the politically or economically powerful
ever purposefully disadvantage themselves? 265
It follows that to the extent the poor align their interest with those of
the politically and economically powerful, they will be more likely to
achieve their goals. This article seeks to achieve that "interest conver-
gence" by bringing the poor out from a socially, economically, and spa-
tially isolated position and into an integrated and visible one. If their
interests align with the majority's interests, society will finally develop
the political will to systematically address the problems of poverty.
With middle-class neighborhoods disappearing and society becom-
ing increasingly stratified by social class, 266 now, more than ever, it is
important to adopt policies that encourage mixed-income living arrange-
ments, particularly those that deconcentrate the poor. Rent control
should be used as one part of a larger strategy to revitalize decaying
neighborhoods, disperse the poor, and promote higher homeownership
rates in inner cities. By enlisting the spirited and underutilized determi-
nation of potential homeowners, along with their stabilizing and posi-
tively socializing presence, blighted communities may be transformed
into healthy and stable places to live. The proposed rent control scheme
264 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment: Brown vs. Board of Education and the Interest Conver-
gence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 524-25 (1980) (arguing that the "decision in Brown to
break with the Court's long-held position on these issues cannot be understood without some
consideration of the decision's value to whites, not simply those concerned about the immoral-
ity of racial inequality, but also those whites in policymaking positions able to see the eco-
nomic and political advances at home and abroad that would follow abandonment of
segregation." Specifically, Brown provided "immediate credibility to America's struggle with
Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging third world peoples", it helped
quell dissension among returning, black, WWII veterans, and last, it helped pave the way for
"further industrialization of the South.").
265 It may be suggested that majorities purposefully disadvantage themselves in a great
number of ways, such as affirmative action and public welfare programs. However, I believe
it is more persuasive to argue that these programs provide substantial, compensating benefits
to the majority. I call attention to the only justification that the Supreme Court has upheld for
affirmative action (aside from redressing past discrimination): diversity in the classroom. The
thrust behind this justification is that it enhances the learning experience of all.
Additionally, public welfare programs have long been justified as being public goods
intended to benefit all of society, not only the poor who receive the direct benefits. See, e.g.,
Dwight R. Lee & Richard B. McKenzie, Second Thoughts on the Public-Good Justification for
Government Poverty Programs, 19 J. Legal Stud. 189 (Jan. 1990).
266 See supra note 92.
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ety and prevent unhealthy neighborhood conditions from producing the
costly "concentration effects" that benefit no one.
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APPENDIX
1. Additional Tenant Protections
If the locality is concerned that displaced tenants will simply to an-
other neighborhood with concentrated poverty, it has the option of adopt-
ing additional tenant protections. While this would certainly be a tricky
task, localities can adopt sensible anti-displacement policies by under-
standing the underlying power dynamic between landlords and tenants.
If adopted, the tenant protections must align landlords' and tenants'
incentives so that each party's rational, self-interested decisions will pro-
duce a healthy and stable neighborhood. In the relationship between
them, no group can have a disproportionate amount of power over the
other. If landlords are allowed to arbitrarily increase rents or to freely
evict tenants, they will enjoy too much power and low-income tenants
may be replaced by higher-income ones. On the other hand, if landlords
are not able to increase the rent or if they cannot evict the tenants, the
balance of power may swing too far in favor of tenants by converting
them into virtual life tenants. The key is to find a workable balance of
power between each group, a balance that traditional rent control
schemes have struggled to establish.
To strike a workable balance of power between landlords and te-
nants, many jurisdictions have adopted the "good cause" requirement.
This requirement has been adopted by the federal government (public
housing)267 and many jurisdictions (traditional rent control) 268 to pur-
posefully make it difficult for landlords to carry out evictions. Under
"good cause" provisions, evictions are only allowed when the tenant has
breached a provision in his lease. However, this swings the balance of
power far onto the side of the tenant, a result that is equally undesirable
because it makes it difficult to ever evict a tenant.269
267 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(l) (2007) ("Each public housing agency shall utilize leases
which ... require that the public housing agency may not terminate the tenancy except for
serious or repeated violation of the terms or conditions of the lease or for other good cause.").
268 Cities that have tenant protections built into their rent control laws commonly include
"good cause" eviction provisions. See, e.g., East Palo Alto, Cal., Ordinance to Stabilize Rents
for Residential Housing and Establish Good Cause Evictions § 13(A) (1988) (prohibiting evic-
tion of tenants in rent stabilized units unless a specifically enumerated condition is satisfied).
269 In order to evict a tenant for "good cause," a landlord must allege and prove a lease
violation by the tenant. For obvious reasons, it is more difficult to carry out a "good cause"
eviction than an eviction for no reason whatsoever. Aside from evidentiary difficulties, the
court process for "good cause" evictions is more complicated than evictions for non-payment
of rent. A landlord may need to comply with discovery requests, respond to pre-trial motions,
and interview witnesses, among other procedural and substantive requirements. These tasks
are difficult in their own right, and are made even more difficult where a tenant hires an
attorney.
Landlords, of course, may hire an attorney as well. However, it is the author's personal
experience that these cases are often burdensome to the attorney and therefore costly for the
landlord. If the case eventually goes to trial, securing all of the witnesses and evidentiary
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To address this conundrum, one possible solution is to make the in-
moving resident landlords subject to a gradually increasing rent ceil-
ing. 270 When the resident landlord purchases the home from an absentee
landlord, the resident landlord should be able to charge market rents for
each rented unit. However, once there is turnover in any one of the units,
the graduated rent scheme could apply. For instance, the rent ceiling
could be set at a progressively higher level commensurate with the ten-
ant's length of tenure. If the ceiling in Year 1 is $600, the ceiling in Year
2 should be, say, $650, in Year 3, $700, and so on. When the current
tenant vacates the apartment and a new tenant moves in, the landlord
would return to the Year 1 ceiling. 271 This balances the amount of bar-
gaining leverage landlords and tenants enjoy and will ensure that both
parties have an incentive to create a long-term peaceable living arrange-
ment, a condition that is vitally important for enhancing a neighbor-
hood's stability.
Landlords will have a financial incentive to enable tenants live in
the apartment for long periods of time because, as time goes by, the land-
lord will be able to charge progressively higher rents. However, after
enough time passes and the landlord is able to charge market rents or
higher, the landlord will probably elect to charge rent slightly below the
prevailing market level.272 This decision would serve the purpose of en-
couraging tenants to remain in the apartment because the landlord would
want to avoid the tenant vacating and having to return to the Year 1 base
rent level.
Landlords would, however, maintain the right to evict tenants, even
without "good cause." Since landlords must live alongside potentially
unwelcome, or even unruly, tenants, it is important that landlords enjoy
material proves difficult and often eviction actions fail. Therefore, providing a "good cause"
provision to protect tenants from displacement would swing the balance of power too far in
favor of tenants by making it extremely difficult for landlords to evict.
270 Many localities allow landlords to increase controlled rents to keep pace with infla-
tion. See, e.g., San Jose Rent Control Ordinance discussed in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485
U.S. 1 (1988). The proposed rent control plan is designed independent of yearly cost of living
adjustments.
271 It is important to stress that the graduated rent scheme is an optional feature of this
proposal. If the locality believes that either absentee landlords or new resident landlords will
manipulate the system to evict the existing tenants, the locality is certainly free to provide
additional tenant protections. The graduated rent scheme is merely one suggestion for dealing
with this potential problem.
If localities do indeed choose to include additional tenant protections, it is important to set
the Year 1, 2, and 3 rents at levels that will not make the investment unprofitable for resident
landlords.
272 Tenants may acquire a personal attachment to the apartment and may be willing to pay
fair market value rent for the unit. However, this personal preference (which cannot be ex-
pected to apply to all tenants with the same force) will be balanced by the landlord's risk of
dropping down to the Year 1 base rent. On average, rent levels in the rent-controlled neigh-
borhood will be slightly lower than those in other, non-controlled neighborhoods.
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the power to evict. However, the thought of reverting back to the Year 1
rent ceiling will militate against the landlord capriciously and arbitrarily
evicting the tenants.
Tenants will similarly benefit from the graduated rent scheme.
Principally, since landlords would benefit if tenants remain in the apart-
ment for long spans, landlords would offer incentives like higher quality
services or lower rents to convince tenants to stay. Not only will this
improve the maintenance and physical conditions of the apartments, but
it will induce tenants to remain in the neighborhood for longer periods.
Over time, tenants will invest greater energy towards building social re-
lations in the neighborhood and will invest more time in improving the
long-term health of the neighborhood and its institutions. 273
The final method in which the existing poor tenants may find them-
selves displaced is through eviction notices from either the absentee
landlord or the in-moving resident landlord. It is plausible that many
members of the risk-averse middle class will foresee the changes that a
neighborhood will experience under rent control and will purchase
homes in blighted areas. Ostensibly, these potential gentrifiers will rea-
son that if there is enough demand for these homes by fellow middle-
class members, they could all purchase the homes, evict the residents,
and change the character of the area virtually overnight. More realistic,
however, is the prospect that absentee landlords will perceive a greater
value if the home is sold free of any tenants. Perhaps the absentee land-
lord can command a higher price by attracting resident landlords who
prefer to fill the house with their own tenants. The additional purchasing
power of the stable middle class may allow them to pressure absentee
landlords to clear the area of poor tenants as a precondition to purchase.
273 Local lawmakers should be careful to set the Year 1 rent ceiling for in-moving resi-
dent landlords at an appropriate level and should be intentional about the yearly rent increases.
The Year I rent ceiling should be sufficiently lower than the market rents so as to provide an
adequate level of deterrence against arbitrary evictions. If the Year 1 rent ceiling is too close
to actual market rents, new landlords will have immense bargaining leverage because reverting
back to the Year I rent level will not impose a significant burden. However, the Year 1 rent
ceiling cannot be too much lower than the fair market rent level because it will either give too
much power to tenants or cause the landlords to suffer operating losses.
Next, the yearly, gradual rent increases should be carefully calculated by lawmakers. The
pace at which rent ceilings will reach market levels determines how deterred new landlords
will be from evicting tenants, and how much bargaining leverage these tenants will have. The
Year 1 rent ceiling and the gradual, yearly increases will also determine the level of rent
charged to long-term residents. Even when the rent ceiling exceeds the fair market level,
landlords will likely charge slightly below this amount to encourage their tenants to stay. How
far below the fair market value a landlord charges will be determined by how much the land-
lord wants to avoid dropping to the Year I rent level.
Last, this scheme should include an exception for tenants who are evicted for good cause.
If the tenant breaches his or her lease, it is unfair and counterproductive to force the landlord to
return to the Year I rent level.
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This poses a serious risk that new resident landlords will prefer to
forego the initially high rent ceiling and evict the current tenants, regard-
less of the fact that they would then fall to the lower rent ceiling, Year 1
level, required for new tenants. If the potential gentrifiers have suffi-
ciently high incomes, they would be able to absorb the decreased rental
income and pay a higher percentage of the mortgage payment from their
own non-rental income. Similarly, existing absentee landlords who fore-
see this process may decide it is profitable to evict all tenants and to sell
the empty home to middle-class in-moving homebuyers, who may then
fill the home with higher-income tenants of their choice.
To avoid rapid and wide-scale neighborhood displacement, the rent
control scheme must also include an initial protection for tenants. For
instance, a penalty may be imposed on any landlord who evicts a tenant
within one year of purchasing or selling the home (assuming that the
tenant was not evicted for "good cause"). This penalty would addition-
ally deter sellers from evicting all tenants before the home is sold and
higher-income homebuyers from evicting tenants once they purchase the
home.
Local legislatures may choose to adopt provisions that ensure that
the rent control plan also benefits those tenants who currently live in the
neighborhoods. This is best accomplished by encouraging individuals
who not only commit to live in the neighborhood, but also commit to live
amongst the current residents, to purchase the homes. These additional
tenant protections could certainly help achieve this goal.
2. Risk of Underestimating High Tenancy Turnover
A potential drawback of the additional tenant protections is the risk
that in-moving resident landlords will overestimate the expected rental
income from the apartments. Overestimating the rental income causes a
homebuyer to overvalue the house and to pay too much for it. If the
rental income is lower than expected, many homebuyers may not be able
to afford their monthly mortgage payments and will eventually default on
their loans. Moreover, since in-moving resident landlords will probably
be emerging-middle- and working-class households, even a slight de-
crease in rental income may prevent them from making their mortgage
payments.
Computing the expected rental income is fraught with uncertainty
whenever someone purchases a home, but it is potentially magnified
under the proposed rent control scheme.274 Under the graduated rent
ceilings for resident landlords, the monthly rental income will depend on
274 This uncertainty would be magnified if the locality chooses to include the optional
provisions to prevent tenant displacement, i.e. the graduated rent ceilings discussed supra.
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the tenants' length of tenure; the longer the tenants live in the apartment,
the closer their rent will be to fair market value.2 75 It is difficult to deter-
mine how much rental income will be generated in the short or long term
because rental income will be dependant on the landlord's ability to se-
lect "good" tenants (i.e., tenants who will remain in the apartment for a
long time).
There is a risk that landlords will systematically underestimate the
tenancy turnover rate and consequently, overestimate the monthly rental
income. The uncertainty of the rental income stream will cause a tug-of-
war between increases and decreases in house prices. The risk of perpet-
ually renting to "bad" tenants will decrease the price of homes, while the
belief that short-term tenants can be effectively screened out will in-
crease the price of homes. Eventually, real estate appraisers will set the
price of homes at a level that presumes an average short- and long-term
rental income stream, a practice that leads to its own set of problems.
There is good reason to doubt that real estate appraisers will set the
value of the home at the appropriate level. A level that assumes an aver-
age rental income stream would be suitable, but there is reason to believe
that appraisers will assume an above-average rental income stream. The
role of the real estate appraiser is to give an independent valuation of the
home so that the mortgagor (i.e. bank) has the appropriate amount of
collateral against its loan. However, since appraisers earn their fee on a
per engagement basis, and are usually selected by the real estate broker,
they have an incentive to appraise the home at a level amenable to the
real estate broker. This ensures that the real estate broker, who has great
demand for home appraisals, returns to the company for future apprais-
als. Since real estate brokers earn commissions as a percentage of the
total loan amount, they prefer appraisers who systematically, but not be-
yond a reasonable level, overvalue the homes. 276
275 Notably, this will not provide incentive for rent control tenants to leave the apartment
as rents approach the market level. The graduated rent ceiling protects low-income tenants
from increased rents caused by high demand and low supply. If rent control is applied to
limited areas, it is unlikely that tenants will be able to find another rent-controlled apartment.
Thus, tenants acting as rational market actors will opt to stay in the rent-controlled apartment
even as rents rise in order to take advantage of the improved neighborhood and the slightly
below-market rents.
276 Under the current system of home purchases and mortgage applications, mortgagors/
banks must rely on appraisers being truly independent parties. If the mortgagor industry loses
the trust in appraisers' independence, a new system will have to be devised that shuts out these
"independent" appraisers. Therefore, there is reason to believe that the appraisals will approx-
imate the true market values. However, the administrative cost involved prohibits each bank
(sometimes national banks) from either having a local monitoring group or having their own
local appraisal services. Banks' inability to micromanage the appraisal process will cause
home values to be systematically overvalued. See Reassessing Rent Control, supra note 180,
at 1840 ("[E]xperts, particularly real estate brokers, have incentives to create expectations of
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This problem is seen most often in refinancing situations. For mort-
gage refinances, there is no "buyer" to exert downward pressure on the
valuation of the property. Without this downward pressure, everyone
benefits by pushing the value of the house higher. The homeowner has a
more valuable asset and can qualify for a lower mortgage rate, the broker
secures a higher commission, and the appraiser has a happy customer
who will request his services again.
This dilemma is not specific to rent-controlled homes, but the added
uncertainty of computing the expected rental income and the added dis-
cretion afforded to appraisers leads to an overvaluation of homes and
ultimately, to foreclosures. This potential drawback should be antici-
pated and addressed by local legislatures, preferably in conjunction with
the local lending industry. Proper control mechanisms and sufficient ed-
ucation ensure that homebuyers are aware of the risks involved and that
they factor these risks into the offer price for the home
For this reason, when local lawmakers include the optional, gradu-
ated rent ceiling, I suggest that the Year 1 base rent amount be set rela-
tively close to the fair market level. Too much of a discount will only
magnify the risk involved in the investment. Since the expected
homebuyers are lower middle-income and emerging middle-income
households, a sensible strategy that minimizes the economic risk that
these households will incur is to set the Year 1 base rent level only
slightly below market level. If it is set too low, these households will be
stripped of precisely what they seek: economic security.
future increases in order to make greater profits."); id. at 1850 ("[R]eal estate brokers have an
incentive to increase commissions by inflating prices").
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